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I.

INTRODUCTION

From its inception, child pornography law has attempted to reconcile two powerful interests: the First Amendment and the prevention of sexual exploitation of children. The compelling nature
of the government's interest in preventing the sexual exploitation
of children through the production and distribution of sexually
explicit images of children is well-accepted, if not unassailable.1
Balanced against the government's interest in protecting children
from sexual abuse are the First Amendment interests implicated
in content based prohibitions of speech. For much of the history of
child pornography law, courts usually resolved these competing
interests in favor of the government. In the most significant case,
New York v. Ferber,2 the Supreme Court held that the government's interest in safeguarding children from sexual abuse was so
powerful that it justified an exception to the First Amendment
allowing the government to proscribe sexually explicit images of
minors without having to prove that the images are obscene.3
Recently, the Court struck a different balance by invalidating a
criminal statute that the government had termed a child pornography provision. In Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition,4 the Court
struck down provisions of the Child Pornography Prevention Act
of 1996 (CPPA) that proscribed "virtual" child pornography.5 The
CPPA was the result of Congress's concern that advances in technology had enabled the creation of virtual child pornography,
which is defined as computer-generated images of children engaging in sexually explicit conduct that look identical to images of
actual children engaging in sexually explicit conduct. In the
1 There have been criticisms of child pornography law. See, e.g., Amy Adler,
The Perverse Law of Child Pornography, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 209 (2001)
[hereinafter Adler, Perverse Law]. For the most part, though, those criticizing
child pornography law have focused on its margins rather than the core principle
that child pornography is an unprotected category of speech under the First
Amendment.
2 458 U.S. 747 (1982).
3 See infra notes 22-34 and accompanying text (describing the Ferber
decision.)
4 535 U.S. 234 (2002).
5 See infra notes 53-76 and accompanying text (describing the Free Speech
decision).
6 See S. REP. No. 104-358, at 2 (1996); Free Speech, 535 U.S. at 241 (referring
to these images as "virtual child pornography"). In addition to wholly computergenerated images, Congress was concerned about the ability of computer and
computer imaging technology to alter sexually explicit images in such a way as to
make it impossible to determine if an actual child is depicted or to alter innocent
images of a child to make it appear as though the child is engaging in sexually
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CPPA, Congress defined and proscribed these images as child pornography and defended its new broader definition of child pornography on the basis that virtual child pornography threatened to
undermine the prosecution of actual child pornography cases and
because it viewed virtual child pornography as itself dangerous. 7
In Free Speech, however, the Court found the virtual child pornography provisions to be unconstitutional under the First Amendment, in part because the provisions went beyond Ferber in
images where no actual sexual abuse of a
attempting to proscribe
8
child had occurred.
In the aftermath of the Free Speech decision, Congress passed
the Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools to end the Exploitation of Children Today Act of 2003 (PROTECT Act), which contains provisions that are similar to, but much narrower than,
those struck down in Free Speech.' The legislation reveals that,
paradoxically, Congress now has a much more conservative opinion about the existence of virtual child pornography than it did in
1996 when enacting the CPPA. Whereas in enacting the CPPA
Congress found that virtual child pornography could be inexpensively and easily produced, in enacting the PROTECT Act, seven
years later, Congress found that there is no evidence that virtual
child pornography is currently being produced.1 ° Congress no
longer justifies regulation of virtual child pornography on the
basis that it is harmful, but instead only desires to regulate virtual child pornography to the extent that doing so is necessary in
order to effectively prosecute actual child pornography cases."
explicit conduct. These images are "virtual" in the sense that they are either of
children who do not exist or depict a scene of sexual abuse that never occurred.
See infra notes 44-51 and accompanying text. Although the term "virtual child
pornography" can include images that have been altered to make it appear either
that an identifiable minor is depicted, or, conversely, that an identifiable minor
is not depicted, as well as wholly computer-generated images, this Article will
use the term to refer only to wholly computer-generated images unless otherwise
indicated in the text. The author also intends, unless otherwise indicated, for the
term "virtual child pornography" to be understood as referring to computergenerated sexually explicit images of children which are facially
indistinguishable from sexually explicit images produced using actual children,
rather than computer-generated images that can be readily distinguished from
those produced using actual children.
7 See infra notes 45-47 and accompanying text.
s See infra notes 57-58 and accompanying text.
9 See infra Part III.
10 See infra notes 97-98 and accompanying text.
1 See infra notes 96-99 and accompanying text.
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In enacting another prohibition of virtual child pornography,
the PROTECT Act attempts to do what the Court in Free Speech
said was unconstitutional. No court has yet examined the PROTECT Act and found it to be unconstitutional, but if courts follow
the rationale of the Supreme Court's decision in Free Speech and
the virtual child pornography provisions of the PROTECT Act are
struck down, prosecutions of actual child pornography cases could
be adversely affected. If, as the government fears, virtual child
pornography eventually becomes widely available, the result may
be that the government will have difficulty in many cases establishing that any given image depicts an actual child. Consequently, the government will be unable to prosecute those cases
under child pornography provisions. While the government may
be able to prove that some images are obscene, and thus be able to
prosecute certain cases under obscenity provisions, it will no
longer be able to take advantage of the child pornography exception to the First Amendment created by Ferber in those cases in
which it is unable to establish that the images in question depict
actual children. Such a development would be particularly serious considering that technological innovation, particularly the
invention of computers and the Internet, has already enabled the
proliferation of child pornography beyond anything imagined in
12
Ferber.
This Article attempts to demonstrate that the Court's Free
Speech decision will result in the PROTECT Act being struck
down as unconstitutional and, consequently, may result in the
child pornography exception to the First Amendment being valid
in principle but unhelpful to the government in prosecuting many
cases involving sexually explicit images of minors. Part II of this
See Joseph J. Beard, Virtual Kiddie Porn:A Real Crime?An Analysis of the
PROTECT Act, 21 ENT. & SPORTS LAw 3 (Summer 2003) (stating that "[t]he
Internet has made possible the global distribution of child pornography on a
scale unimaginable in the analog world of photographs transmitted by mail or
other conventional means"); Dina I. Oddis, Combating Child Pornographyon the
Internet: The Council of Europe's Convention on Cybercrime, 16 TEMP. INT'L &
Comp. L.J. 477, 478 (2002) (stating that the growth of child pornography has
"paralleled" the growth of the Internet). The tremendous growth in child
pornography has caused a corresponding increase in child pornography cases for
the FBI. See id. at 478. In "2000, the FBI investigated 2,856 cases of online child
pornography and child sex exploitation," but "[iun 1996, it investigated only 113"
such cases. See id.; see also Daniel S. Armagh, Virtual Child Pornography:
Criminal Conduct or Protected Speech?, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 1993, 1994 (2002)
(stating that "[flederal prosecutions of Internet child pornographers have
increased by 10 percent every year since 1995").
12
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Article describes the creation of the child pornography exception
to the First Amendment and the Court's Free Speech decision
which limited the permissible definition of child pornography.
Part III describes the PROTECT Act, Congress's response to the
Free Speech decision. Part IV analyzes the PROTECT Act and
explains why the Court will likely strike it down as unconstitutional. This Part argues that the Court's decision in Free Speech
means that prohibitions of virtual child pornography are unconstitutional, and because proving that an image depicts an actual
child is a constitutionally required element of a child pornography
offense, the government cannot require a defendant to prove that
an image does not depict an actual child, or even to produce such
evidence. The PROTECT Act's provision proscribing virtual child
pornography is therefore impermissible, and its affirmative
defense requiring the defendant to prove that an image does not
depict an actual child, or at least to produce such evidence, unconstitutionally shifts the government's burden of proof to the defendant. Thus, the affirmative defense cannot save the virtual child
pornography provision from being struck down.
In light of the likelihood that the virtual child pornography provisions of the PROTECT Act will be invalidated, Part V proposes
that a presumption instructing the jury that it may find that an
image depicts an actual child if it looks like it depicts an actual
child, or instructing them to make such a finding, is currently a
viable alternative to the PROTECT Act's regulation of virtual
child pornography. This Part explains that such a presumption
may not be a long-term solution to the virtual child pornography
problem, however, because the future production and distribution
of virtual child pornography will undermine the basis for any type
of presumption that an image depicts an actual child if it looks
like it depicts an actual child. Finally, Part VI discusses the
implications of the PROTECT Act being struck down. The government has been very successful in prosecuting child pornography
cases after the Free Speech decision. 3 If, however, the government is eventually unable to meet its burden of proving that
images depict actual children because of the existence of virtual
child pornography, and is forced to prosecute child pornography
cases under obscenity statutes instead, it will undoubtedly have to

See infra notes 117-125 and accompanying text (explaining the
government's success).
13
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expend more resources prosecuting cases and will obtain fewer
convictions.

II.

CHILD PORNOGRAPHY LAW BEFORE THE

PROTECT

ACT

A.

Creation of the Child PornographyException
to the FirstAmendment
Pornographic material that is obscene has long been held by the
Supreme Court to be a category of speech that is not protected
under the First Amendment. 14 While general federal restrictions
on obscenity are not new, federal legislative efforts to directly prohibit child pornography are of fairly recent origin.' 5 The short history of child pornography law reveals a growing societal concern
about the existence of child pornography and, especially on the
federal level, corresponding governmental efforts to combat child
pornography by enacting new child pornography laws that are
increasingly harsh and aggressive. 6 Until recently, the govern14 See Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S. 564, 574 (2002) (indicating that "[o]bscene
speech . . . has long been held to fall outside the purview of the First

Amendment"); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571 (1942) (stating
that "certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech," such as
obscenity, "have never been thought to raise any Constitutional problem"); cf.
Virgina v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 358 (2003) (explaining that "[tihe protections
afforded by the First Amendment . . . are not absolute, and we have long

recognized that the government may regulate certain categories of expression
consistent with the Constitution"). The first state obscenity statute was passed
by Vermont in 1821, and the first federal obscenity statute was enacted in 1842.
See P. Heath Brockwell, Comment, Grappling with Miller v. California: The
Search for an Alternative Approach to Regulating Obscenity, 24 CUMB. L. REV.
131, 131 n.9 (1993-1994); see also Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484-85
(1957) (describing the history of obscenity laws); Gary D. Marts, Jr.,
Constitutional Law-FirstAmendment and Freedom of Speech-"It's Ok-She's
a Pixel, Not a Pixie." The FirstAmendment Protects Virtual Child Pornography.
Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234 (2002), 25 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK

L. REV. 717, 731-38 (2003) (describing development of obscenity law in the
United States).
15 Press Release, News from the Hall of Congress, Hall Sponsors
Constitutional Amendment to Prohibit Child Pornography on Internet (July 17,
2002) (Congressman Ralph M. Hall), at http://www.house.gov/apps/list/press/
tx04 hall/antiporn.html (last visited Mar. 26, 2004).
16 See MAx TAYLOR & ETHEL QUAYLE, CHILD PORNOGRAPHY: AN INTERNET
CRIME 1-20 (2003) (documenting the growing societal concern about the harm
caused by child pornography and the role of the Internet in increasing the
visibility of child pornography); Adler, Perverse Law, supra note 1, at 209
(suggesting that society's obsession with child sexual abuse may in fact create
and perpetuate that abuse). Congress's desire to treat child pornography
offenders harshly is illustrated by the PROTECT Act. The PROTECT Act
deleted many of the grounds for reducing sentences below the applicable
sentencing range in the federal sentencing guidelines (removing much of the
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ment's efforts to define and criminalize child pornography have
been almost uniformly upheld by courts, including the Supreme
17
Court.
Before the Court created the child pornography exception to the
First Amendment, the government prosecuted all sexually explicit
material under obscenity statutes. In 1973, after struggling for
decades to agree on a definition of obscenity, the Court, in Miller
v. California,18 created a three-part definition of obscenity. The
Court held that material can constitutionally be suppressed as
obscenity if: "(a) . . . 'the average person applying contemporary
community standards' would find that the work, taken as a whole,
appeals to the prurient interest; (b) ... [the average person applying contemporary community standards would find that] the work
depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct
specifically defined by the applicable state law; and (c) . . . the
work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or
scientific value."1 9 Following Miller, Congress, alarmed by the
growing availability of child pornography, first attempted to proscribe child pornography in the Protection of Children Against
Sexual Exploitation Act of 1977.20 Using an obscenity standard,
the 1977 act created a new statute, 18 U.S.C. § 2252, which
criminalized the knowing transportation, shipment, or sale of
obscene visual or print depictions of minors engaging in sexually
explicit conduct.2 1
discretion exercised by sentencing judges) and created or increased mandatory
minimum sentences for child pornography offenses, including a new five year
mandatory minimum sentence for receipt of child pornography. See PROTECT
Act, Pub. L. No. 108-21, §§ 103, 401, 117 Stat. 650, 652-53, 667-76 (2003).
17 See generally Amy Adler, Inverting the FirstAmendment, 149 U. PA. L. REV.
921 (2001) (arguing that courts have not applied the same stringent First
Amendment protections to child pornography that they have to other forms of
speech).
18 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
19 Id. at 24.
20 Protection of Children Against Sexual Exploitation Act of 1977, Pub. L. No.
95-225, § 2252, 92 Stat. 7 (1978). The intent of Congress was not to create a legal
definition of child pornography without a requirement that the government
prove that the material at issue was obscene, but rather to strengthen existing
obscenity laws by providing more severe penalties for the distribution and sale of
obscene materials that depicted children. See S. REP. No. 95-438, at 3 (1977).
While experts testified before Congress that "virtually all of the child
pornography currently on the market could be prosecuted under the existing
federal obscenity statutes," Congress believed that it needed to encourage federal
authorities to crack down on child pornography. Id. at 47-48.
21 See 18 U.S.C. § 2252 (2002). In addition to § 2252, Congress added another
section, now 18 U.S.C. § 2251, which prohibited the use of minors in "sexually
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In Ferber,22 the Court made child pornography a new and distinct category of speech unprotected under the First Amendment,
upholding a New York state statute banning visual representations of sexual performances by children under 16 years of age
even though the statute did not require that the images be
obscene. 23 The Court offered several reasons for its creation of a
new category of unprotected speech that would give the government "greater leeway in the regulation of pornographic depictions
of children."2 4 First, the Court acknowledged that the government's "interest in 'safeguarding the physical and psychological
well-being of a minor' is 'compelling.' ''25 Second, the distribution
of child pornography is intrinsically related to the sexual abuse of
children because the "materials produced are a permanent record
of the children's participation and the harm to the child is exacerbated by their circulation. ' 26 In addition, "[t]he advertising and
selling of child pornography provide an economic motive for and
are thus an integral part of the production of such materials, an
activity illegal throughout the Nation." 27 In the Court's view, the
most expeditious method of law enforcement is to close the distribution network for child pornography in order to control the production of child pornography.28
The Court further found that the Miller standard "does not
reflect the State's particular and more compelling interest in prosecuting those who promote the sexual exploitation of children." 29
The Court considered the value of images of children engaged in
sexually explicit conduct to be "exceedingly modest, if not de
minimis," and stated that they would not be likely to constitute a
necessary part of a literary performance or scientific or educational work.3 0 The Miller standard, which focuses on a commuexplicit" productions, and prohibited parents and guardians from allowing their
children to be so used. Id. § 2251. A third section, now 18 U.S.C. § 2256, as
amended, contained definitions. 18 U.S.C § 2253(2)(A)-(E)(1978) (amended by 18
U.S.C § 2256 (1986)).
22
23

24

458 U.S. 747 (1982).
Id. at 764 n.17.
Id. at 756.

Id. at 756-57 (citation omitted). Indeed, the Court found that "[t]he
prevention of sexual exploitation and abuse of children constitutes a government
objective of surpassing importance." Id. at 757.
26 Id.
at 759.
27 Ferber, 458 U.S. at 761.
25

28

Id. at 759.

29

Id.

at 761.

31 See id. at 762-63. The Court stated that there was no question of censoring

a particular literary theme or portrayal of sexual activity, because the "First
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nity's toleration for sexually oriented material, "bears no
connection to the issue of whether a child has been physically or
3
psychologically harmed in the production of the work." Thus,
"It]he test for child pornography is separate from the obscenity
32
standard enunciated in Miller." The Court reasoned that creating a child pornography exception to the First Amendment would
not be inconsistent with its earlier decisions, which allowed content based prohibitions of speech when "the evil to be restricted so
overwhelmingly outweighs the expressive interests, if any, at
33
stake, that no process of case-by-case adjudication is required."
The Court's holding in Ferber that child pornography is an
unprotected category of speech under the First Amendment, and
can be prohibited regardless of whether it is also obscene, led to
3 4 Among
Congress passing the Child Protection Act in 1984.
other changes, the Act amended 18 U.S.C. § 2252 to no longer
require the government to prove that child pornography is
obscene.3 5 In the years following the 1984 legislation, despite the
reduction in the government's burden of proof enabled by the Ferber decision, Congress remained convinced that child pornography
was a serious national problem. In 1988, Congress, on the recomAmendment interest is limited to that of rendering the portrayal somewhat more
'realistic' by utilizing or photographing children," and there were alternatives,
such as "simulation" or a "person over the statutory age who perhaps looked
younger . . . ." Id. at 763.
31 Id. at 761.
32 Ferber, 458 U.S. at 764.
33 Id. at 763-64 (stating that whether speech is protected by the First
Amendment frequently depends on the content of the speech (citing Young v.
Am. Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 66 (1976)). The Court stated that although
child pornography is "without the protection of the First Amendment," the
conduct to be prohibited must be adequately limited and defined, only visual
depictions could be proscribed under the child pornography standard and "some
element of scienter on the part of the defendant" would be required. See id. at
64-65.
34 Child Protection Act of 1984, ch. 110, § 2251, 98 Stat. 204 (1984) (current
version at 18 U.S.C. § 2251 (2000)).
35 Congress believed that eliminating the obscenity standard would "have the
effect of making proof of these offenses easier." H.R. REP. 98-536, at 7 (1983).
The Department of Justice noted that while it believed "that few if any
prosecutions have not been brought or not been successful in the past because of
the obscenity requirement," eliminating the requirement would "enhance the
enforcement of [the] statute," and streamline prosecutions by eliminating the
need for the government to produce evidence of obscenity. Id. at 11. In addition,
the 1984 Act redefined "minor" to mean anyone under the age of eighteen,
replaced the word "lewd" with the word "lascivious" in the definition of sexually
explicit conduct, and struck the condition making child pornography a criminal
offense only when engaged in "for pecuniary profit." Id. at 2-4.
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mendation of the Attorney General's Commission on Pornography,
passed the Child Protection and Obscenity Enforcement Act
which, among other things, created a recordkeeping requirement
for producers of sexually explicit images. 6 The Commission
found that producers, catering to the child pornography market,
often used very young looking performers, which made it difficult
for authorities to determine whether the performers were minors
and allowed producers to claim ignorance about the ages of the
performers. 3
In 1990, a second child pornography decision by the Court,
Osborne v. Ohio," opened the door to a federal prohibition of possession of child pornography by upholding a state ban on possession of child pornography. 3 9 In so holding, the Court
distinguished its decision in Stanley v. Georgia, in which it had
held that the government could not punish the mere possession of
obscenity in the privacy of one's own home.4 ° The Court found
that even assuming that there are First Amendment interests in
the viewing and possession of child pornography, the interests
underlying child pornography prohibitions far exceed the interests
justifying the regulation of obscenity, and it could not "fault Ohio
for attempting to stamp out this vice at all levels in the distribution chain."4 ' In addition to the governmental interests already
identified in Ferber, the Court took into account the harm to nondepicted children who are seduced or coerced by child pornogra36 Child Protection and Obscenity Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, 102 Stat.
4181, 4485-89 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 2257). See also 1986 ATT'Y
GEN. ANN. REP. 595, 619.
31 See 1986 ATr'y GEN. ANN. REP., at 618.
38 495 U.S. 103 (1990).
3' The Court found that, "[gliven the importance of the State's interest in
protecting the victims of child pornography," the State was justified in
"attempting to stamp out this vice at all levels in the distribution chain." Id. at
110. The Court noted Ohio's argument that since Ferber much of the market for
child pornography had gone underground, making it nearly impossible to stop
the harm done to children by only attacking the distribution and production of
child pornography. Id. Following the decision, Congress passed the Child
Protection Restoration and Penalties Enhancement Act of 1990, which, among
other things, prohibited the possession of three or more pieces of child
pornography. Pub. L. No. 101-647, § 322, 104 Stat. 4816, 4818 (1990).
40 394 U.S. 557, 565 (1969).
41 Osborne, 495 U.S. at 110. In contrast to Stanley, where Georgia sought to
proscribe the private possession of obscenity because it was concerned that
obscenity would poison the minds of its viewers, Ohio sought to prohibit the
possession of child pornography in order to protect the victims of child
pornography and destroy the child pornography market. See id. at 109.
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phy.4 2 The Court thus suggested that protecting children who are
images is a legitimate and
not actually pictured in photographic
43
compelling state interest.
In the mid-1990s, Congress became concerned about improvements in technology which it believed made it possible to manipulate existing sexually explicit images to make them appear as
though minors are depicted, to alter sexually explicit images to
make it impossible to determine if an actual child is depicted, and
also to produce realistic computer-generated virtual images that
appear to, but do not, depict actual minors engaging in sexually
explicit conduct.4 4 Congress believed that the creation of this type
of virtual child pornography, unknown at the time of the Ferber
decision, would both harm children and render ineffective the
existing child pornography laws.4 5 Thus, Congress passed the
CPPA, which made three fundamental changes to the definition of
child pornography.4 6
The first change was the creation of a new provision, 18 U.S.C.
§ 2256(8)(B), which defined child pornography to include any visId. at 111.
The third child pornography case decided by the Court was United
States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64 (1994). In X-Citement Video, the
Court reversed a Ninth Circuit decision which held that 18 U.S.C. § 2252 was
unconstitutional because it did not contain a scienter element requiring the
government to prove that the defendant knew that one of the performers in the
visual depiction was a minor. Id. at 66. The Court read the statute to contain a
scienter requirement and also rejected the defendant's arguments that the
statute was unconstitutional "because it ma[de] the age of majority 18, rather
than 16 . . . [and] because Congress replaced the term 'lewd' with the term
'lascivious' in defining illegal exhibition of the genitals of children." Id. at 78; see
also id. at 83, 85-86 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Court's statutory
reading was unconvincing and that the Constitution only required that the
prosecution prove the defendant knew that the material was sexually explicit but
not that one of the performers was a minor).
" See Child PornographyPrevention Act of 1995: Hearing on S. 1237 Before
the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. 11 (1996); S. REP. No. 104-358,
at 16 (1996) (statement of Deputy Assistant Attorney General Kevin U.
DiGregory).
New photographic and computer imaging technologies make it possible to
produce by electronic, mechanical, or other means, visual depictions of what
appear to be children engaging in sexually explicit conduct that are virtually
indistinguishable to the unsuspecting viewer from unretouched photographic
images of actual children engaging in sexually explicit conduct. S. REP. No. 104358, at 2; see also Armagh, supra note 12, at 1993-94.
45 See Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 121,
110 Stat. 3009-26 (1996) (establishing congressional findings explaining the need
to proscribe virtual child pornography).
46 Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act, 1997, Pub. L. No. 104-208
(1997).
42

43 Id.
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ual depiction that "appear[ed] to be [ ] of a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct."4 7 The definition covered both computergenerated images of minors and images of adults who appeared to
be minors.4" A second new provision, 18 U.S.C. § 2256(8)(C),
defined child pornography to include visual depictions that have
been "created, adapted, or modified to appear that an identifiable
minor is engaging in sexually explicit conduct."4 9 The third new
provision, 18 U.S.C. § 2256(8)(D), defined child pornography to
include a visual depiction that was pandered "in such a manner
that convey[ed] the impression that the material" was child pornography. 50 The CPPA also included an affirmative defense
which allowed a defendant to escape conviction by establishing
that the images at issue did not depict an actual child and were
not advertised or promoted in such a manner as to suggest that an
actual child was depicted.5 1 Thus, after passage of the CPPA, the
definition of child pornography included images that "appear[ed]
to be," but were not, of minors engaging in sexually explicit conduct, images that were manipulated to make them appear as
though they depicted identifiable minors engaging in sexually
47 Specifically, the CPPA defined child pornography as:
any visual depiction, including any photograph, film, video, picture, or
computer or computer-generated image or picture, whether made or
produced by electronic, mechanical, or other means, of sexually explicit
conduct where(A) the production of such visual depiction involves the use of a minor
engaging in sexually explicit conduct;
(B) such visual depiction is, or appears to be, of a minor engaging in sexually
explicit conduct;
(C) such visual depiction has been created, adapted, or modified to appear
that an identifiable minor is engaging in sexually explicit conduct; or
(D) such visual depiction is advertised, promoted, presented, described, or
distributed in such a manner that conveys the impression that the material
is or contains a visual depiction of a minor engaging in sexually explicit
conduct ..
"
CPPA, Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-26, 28 (codified as amended at 18
U.S.C. § 2256(8)).
Along with the new definitions of child pornography in § 2256(8), the CPPA
created a new provision, § 2252A, which provided criminal penalties for the
knowing reproduction, sale, distribution, receipt, or possession of child
pornography. See id. at 3009-28, 29. Section 2252A was largely duplicative of
the existing criminal penalties in § 2252. See United States v. Reedy, 304 F.3d
358, 364 n.3 (5th Cir. 2002) (stating that § 2252 and § 2252A are
"indistinguishable").
1s See infra note 111.
49 See supra note 47.
50 See supra note 47.
51 Child Pornography Prevention Act § 2252A. The affirmative defense was
not available in possession of child pornography cases. See id.
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explicit conduct, and images that were pandered as child pornogof whether the images were in fact child
raphy regardless
52
pornography.
B.

A Limitation on the Definition of Child Pornography:
Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition

The government's success before the Court in child pornography
cases came to an end in Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition." In
Free Speech, the Court addressed the constitutionality of two of
the definitions of child pornography, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2256(8)(B), (D),
that had been enacted as part of the CPPA.5 4 Although four federal appeals courts rejected constitutional challenges to the
CPPA, the Supreme Court found these two definitional provisions
to be unconstitutionally overbroad. 55 With respect to the pandering provision in 18 U.S.C. § 2256(8)(D), the Court stated that "the
Government [did] not offer a serious defense" of it and summarily
held that the provision was overbroad because it criminalized
speech based on how the speech is presented rather than on what
is depicted.5 6
In striking down § 2256(8)(B), the Court rejected the notion that
virtual child pornography could fit within either the child pornography exception to the First Amendment created in Ferber, or the
obscenity exception to the First Amendment as described in
Miller.57 The Court held that virtual child pornography cannot be
considered to be child pornography under Ferber because no chil58
dren are harmed in the production of virtual child pornography.
The Court further found that § 2256(8)(B) could not be justified as
52

Id. § 2256(8).

53 535 U.S. 234 (2002).
54 The Court was reviewing the Ninth Circuit's decision striking down the

CPPA as unconstitutional. See id. See generally Free Speech Coalition v. Reno,
198 F.3d 1083, 1097 (9th Cir. 1999), rev'd Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535
U.S. 234 (2002). Section 2256(8)(C), defining child pornography to include visual
depictions that have been "created, adapted, or modified to appear that an
identifiable minor is engaging in sexually explicit conduct," was not challenged.
Id. at 1089 n.3. The Court suggested that the provision is constitutional, stating
that although these "morphed images may fall within the definition of virtual
child pornography, they implicate the interests of real children and are in that
sense closer to the images in Ferber." Free Speech, 535 U.S. at 242.
55 See United States v. Fox, 248 F.3d 394, 404 (5th Cir. 2001); United States v.
Mento, 231 F.3d 912, 923 (4th Cir. 2000); United States v. Acheson, 195 F.3d 645,
652 (11th Cir. 1999); United States v. Hilton, 167 F.3d 61, 76 (1st Cir. 1999).
56 Free Speech, 535 U.S. at 257-58.
57 See id. at 240-42, 246-51.
58 Id. at 240-41, 249-51.
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a proscription of obscenity because its provisions made no attempt
to conform to the Miller standard.5 9
In addition to rejecting the characterization of § 2256(8)(B) as
either a child pornography or obscenity provision, the Court
rejected the government's arguments that a prohibition of virtual
child pornography was otherwise justified under the First Amendment.6 0 The Court considered the government's argument that
child pornography, whether actual or virtual, whets the appetites
of pedophiles to engage in molestation and is used by them to
seduce children to be an insufficient basis for upholding
§ 2256(8)(B).6 1 The Court reasoned that the government had
shown no more than a remote connection between speech that
might encourage thoughts or impulses and any resulting child
abuse. 62 The Court held that "[w]ithout a significantly stronger,
more direct connection, the government may not prohibit speech
on the ground that it may encourage pedophiles to engage in illegal conduct."6" Similarly, the Court rejected the argument that
the use of virtual child pornography to seduce children could justify its ban, reasoning that many innocent things may be used for

59 See id. at 240-42. The Court noted that, in contrast to the Miller standard,
§ 2256(8)(B) did not require that the images "appeal to the prurient interest" or
be patently offensive and prohibited the images regardless of whether they had
serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value. See id. at 246.
60 See id. at 251-56.
61 Free Speech, 535 U.S. at 251, 253. In enacting the CPPA, Congress
presented findings stating that any depiction of children involved in sex creates a
"clear and present danger to all children" because child pornography, whether
real or virtual, whets the appetites of child molesters and is used by
pornographers and child molesters to seduce children into sexual activity.' See
Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 402, 110 Stat.
at 3009-26, 3027; see also S. REP. No. 104-358, at 12-13 (1996) (explaining that
child pornography both stimulates the activities of child molesters and is used by
child molesters as a device to break down the resistance and inhibitions of their
targets).
62 Free Speech, 535 U.S. at 253-54.
63 Id.
One author has argued that the Court's view "that the causal link
[between such images and actual instances of child abuse] is contingent and
indirect" is incorrect. See Oddis, supra note 12, at 515-16 (pointing to the
testimony by experts before the Senate Judiciary Committee). The Court's
opinion on the lack of a link between virtual child pornography and harm to
children is not shared by the international community. See Mike Keyser, The
Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime, 12 J. TRANSNAT'L L. & POL'Y 287,
306 (2003) (stating that the Council of Europe in its Convention on Cybercrime
has a provision which contains language nearly identical to that ruled
unconstitutional by the Court).
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immoral purposes and lawful speech may not be prohibited "in an
attempt to shield children from it." 6 4
The Court also rejected the government's argument that the
existence of virtual child pornography threatened to render the
laws against child pornography unenforceable and that a ban on
virtual child pornography, coupled with an affirmative defense
allowing some defendants to prove that the material was made
using only adults, struck a proper constitutional balance.6 5 The
Court reasoned that "protected speech does not become unprotected [speech] merely because it resembles the latter," and "[t]he
Government may not suppress lawful speech as [a] means to suppress unlawful speech. '6 6 While questioning, but ultimately not
deciding, whether any sort of affirmative defense could be constitutional, the Court held that the affirmative defense in the CPPA
was "incomplete and insufficient."67 In particular, the Court
noted that the affirmative defense only included materials produced with youthful looking adults and did not extend to possession offenses or virtual child pornography.6"
In a concurring opinion, Justice Thomas agreed with the Court's
analysis of §§ 2256(8)(B), (D) and interpreted the Court's opinion
as "leav[ing] open the possibility that a more complete affirmative
defense could save a [virtual child pornography] statute's constitu64 Free Speech, 535 U.S. at 251-52. In Osborne v. Ohio, the Court took into
account the fact "that pedophiles use child pornography to seduce . . . children
into sexual activity" as one of several bases for upholding a ban on possession of
child pornography. 495 U.S. 103, 111 (1990); see also supra notes 42-43 and
accompanying text. In Free Speech, however, the Court stated that the
government can punish adults who provide unsuitable materials to children and
thus a complete ban on virtual child pornography for such a reason would not be
narrowly drawn. See 535 U.S. at 252.
65 Free Speech, 535 U.S. at 255-56.
66 Id. at 255.
67 Id. at 255-56. The Court stated that "[t]he Government raises serious
constitutional difficulties by seeking to impose on the defendant the burden of
proving his speech is not unlawful," and that "[iun cases under the CPPA, the
evidentiary burden is not trivial." Id. at 255.
68 Id. at 256. The government also argued that eliminating the market for
actual child pornography was a sufficient reason for upholding the provisions.
The Court rejected the government's argument, speculating that if virtual
images were identical to child pornography produced using actual children, "the
illegal images would be driven from the market by the indistinguishable [ones
because] [flew pornographers would risk prosecution by abusing real children if
fictional, computerized images would suffice." Id. at 254. In the PROTECT Act,
Congress rejected this reasoning. See infra note 235 (criticizing the Court's
reasoning).
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tionality."6 9 Justice Thomas argued that if technological advances
make "it [] impossible to enforce actual child pornography laws
because the Government cannot prove that certain pornographic
images are of real children," a "narrowly drawn restriction" on virtual child pornography might be constitutional.7 ° Justice Thomas
noted, however, that while the government had claimed that
defendants had raised the defense that child pornographic images
may have been computer-generated, it could not point to any cases
where the defense had been successful. 7 '
Justice O'Connor wrote an opinion, concurring in the judgment
in part and dissenting in part, in which she dissented with respect
to the Court's treatment of § 2256(8)(B) but agreed with the
majority's judgment that § 2256(8)(D) was unconstitutional.7 2
Justice O'Connor agreed with the majority that § 2556(8)(B) was
unconstitutional as applied to youthful looking adults but argued
that it was constitutional as applied to virtual child pornography.7 3 In Justice O'Connor's view, "given the rapid [ advances in
computer-graphics technology," even if no defendants had yet created reasonable doubt through a virtual child pornography
defense, "the Government's concern was reasonable," and Congress should not be required to "wait for harm to occur before it
can legislate against it." 74 Chief Justice Rehnquist, joined by Justice Scalia, wrote a dissenting opinion which agreed with Justice
O'Connor that the ban on virtual child pornography was constitutional but argued that § 2256(8)(B) should be interpreted as not
proscribing "youthful looking adult" pornography.7 5 In addition,
Chief Justice Rehnquist argued that § 2256(8)(D) was constitu-

69
70

Free Speech, 535 U.S. at 259-60 (Thomas, J., concurring).
Id. at 259.

71 Id.

See id. at 261 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
See id. at 262-67.
71 Id. at 264 (citing Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180, 212 (1997)).
While Justice O'Connor argued that the ban on virtual child pornography should
survive strict scrutiny, she agreed with the majority that it did not fit within the
child pornography exception to the First Amendment. Free Speech, 535 U.S. at
262-63. In addition to the possibility that defendants could raise a virtual
pornography defense, Justice O'Connor argued that "the ban on virtual child
pornography" was justified because virtual child pornography "whet[s] the
appetites of child molesters . . . who may use the images to seduce young
children." Id. at 263.
" Free Speech, 535 U.S. at 269-70 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
72

13
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pornogrational because it only proscribed "pandering" of child
76
phy, which is not protected by the First Amendment.

III.

CONGRESS ENACTS THE PROTECT ACT IN RESPONSE TO
ASHCROFT V. FREE SPEECH COALITION

The Court's controversial decision in Free Speech has received a
great deal of attention from writers, some arguing that the decision protects free speech and artistic expression, and others arguing that the Court erred in failing to define child pornography as
encompassing virtual child pornography.7 7 The Department of
Justice, supported by Congress, has been one of the Court's biggest critics. The Department of Justice "believes [that the Court's
decision] warrant[ed] a prompt legislative response" because it
made "[e]nforcement of the child pornography laws substantially
more difficult [and] threaten [ed] to reinvigorate" the trafficking of
child pornography. 78 Congress considered several different avenues of response in the aftermath of the Free Speech decision,
76 See id. at 271-72. Chief Justice Rehnquist reasoned that § 2256(8)(D)
should have been interpreted narrowly as only applying to the actual panderer of
child pornography and that only the "knowing possession of materials actually
containing" actual or virtual child pornography should be prohibited. Id. at 27173.
77 Compare Paul Finkelman, Picture Perfect: The First Amendment Trumps
Congress in Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 38 TULSA L. REV. 243, 261 (2002)
(arguing that the Court's decision "supported free speech and artistic
expression"); Dannielle Cisneros, Virtual Child Pornography on the Internet: A
'Virtual Victim'?, 2002 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 19, *1 (2002) (taking the position
that "the [G]overnment's argument that 'virtual child' pornography encourages
pedophiles to abuse children . . . is the intellectual equivalent of a claim that
Romeo and Juliet encourages teenagers to kill themselves and should be banned
from high school reading lists"); David L. Hudson, Jr., Reflecting on the Virtual
Child Porn Decision, 36 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 211, 221 (2002) (stating that the
decision "protected freedom of thought, freedom of speech, and the First
Amendment"), with Vincent McCarthy, Child Pornography in a Virtual World:
The ContinuedBattle to Preserve the Child Pornography PreventionAct of 1996,
23 CARDOZO L. REV. 2019, 2020 (2002) (arguing that the Court should have
upheld the CPPA); Maria Markova, Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition: The
Constitutionality of Congressional Efforts to Ban Computer-Generated
Pornography, 24 WHITTIER L. REV. 985 (2003) (adopting "the position that the
Supreme Court should have upheld" the CPPA).

See also Leading Cases,

Freedom of Speech and Expression, 116 HARV. L. REV. 262, 269-70 (2002) (stating
that the Court focused on the CPPA's "marginal applications rather than the
hard-core pornography that the CPPA squarely implicate[d]" and that the
decision was "yet another indication of [the Court's] increasing distrust of
categorical, value-based exclusions from First Amendment protection").
7s See The Child Abduction Prevention Act and - The Child Obscenity and
Pornography Prevention Act of 2003: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Crime,
Terrorism, and Homeland Security of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th
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including a constitutional amendment which would have provided
that virtual child pornography is unprotected speech. 7 9 Finally,
Congress replaced the provisions of the CPPA that were struck
down in Free Speech with the PROTECT Act, signed by the President on April 30, 2003.80
The PROTECT Act narrows the reach of the virtual child pornography definition in § 2256(8)(B) in several ways."' Perhaps
the centerpiece of the amendments is the substitution in
§ 2256(8)(B) of the phrase "indistinguishable from [] that of a
minor" for the "appears to be [] of a minor" phrase struck down by
the Court in Free Speech. 2 Similar to the CPPA definition struck
down in Free Speech, under new § 2256(8)(B), "the Government is
Cong. 1, (2003) (statement of Daniel P. Collins, Associate Deputy Attorney
General), availableat 2003 WL 1079511 [hereinafter Collins].
79 On July 17, 2002, a Joint Resolution was proposed to add a constitutional
amendment providing that virtual child pornography is not constitutionally
protected. H.R.J. Res. 106, 107th Cong. (2002). Other proposed legislation
included the Child Obscenity and Pornography Prevention Act of 2002 (COPPA),
H.R. 4623, 107th Cong. (2002); the Child Obscenity and Pornography Prevention
Act of 2003 (COPPA), H.R. 1161, 108th Cong. (2003); and the Prosecutorial
Remedies and Tools Against the Exploitation of Children Today Act of 2002, S.
2520, 107th Cong. (2002).
80 PROTECT Act, Pub. L. No. 108-21, §§ 102-601, 117 Stat. 650 (2003).
81 The PROTECT Act struck § 2256(8)(D), which had also been ruled
unconstitutional in Free Speech. See id. In addition, the PROTECT Act enacted
many new provisions, some of which are related to the government's interest in
combating child pornography. One of the new provisions, intended to replace
§ 2256(8)(D), is in § 2252A(a)(3)(B) and prohibits acts, relating to the distribution
of any materials, that are "intended to cause another to believe that the material
is, or contains an obscene visual depiction of a minor engaging in sexually
explicit conduct," or "a visual depiction of an actual minor engaging in sexually
explicit conduct." Id. § 503. Another new provision, § 2252A(a)(6)(c), prohibits
providing a minor with either actual or virtual child pornography "for the
purpose of inducing or persuading [the] minor to participate in any activity that
is illegal." Id. Congress also enacted a new obscenity provision, § 1466A, which
covers images of minors, either real or virtual, "engaging in sexually explicit
conduct." Id. § 504. See infra notes 238-44 and accompanying text (discussing
the new obscenity provision).
82 PROTECT Act § 502(a), 117 Stat. at 678 (2003) (codified as amended at 18
U.S.C. § 2256(8)(B)(2003)). Section 2256 now provides: "(B) such visual depiction
is a digital image, computer image, or computer-generated image that is, or is
indistinguishable from, that of a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct[.]"
See 18 U.S.C. § 2256. The term "virtually indistinguishable" first appeared in
the Congressional Findings in support of the CPPA. See Omnibus Consolidated
Appropriations Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 104-208, §§ 121(5), 121(8), 121(13), 110
Stat. 3009, 3026-27 (1996). Justice O'Connor argued in the dissenting part of her
opinion in Free Speech that the Court should have narrowly construed the
"appears to be" phrase in the version of 18 U.S.C. § 2256(8)(B) struck down by
the Court as being equivalent to "virtually indistinguishable." See Ashcroft v.
Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234, 264-65 (2002) (O'Connor, J., concurring in
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not required to prove in its case-in-chief that the computer-generated [visual depiction] is that of a[n] [actual] minor," only that the
image is "indistinguishable from [] that of an actual minor. "83
The PROTECT Act also created a new section, § 2256(11), which
explains that in order for a virtual image to be "indistinguishable"
from an actual image, "an ordinary person viewing the depiction
would conclude that the depiction is of an actual minor engaged in
sexually explicit conduct." 4 Section 2256(11) thus attempts to
falls within
clarify that only convincing virtual child pornography
5
the child pornography definition in § 2256(8)(B).1
The definition of virtual child pornography in § 2256(8)(B) is
and "comlimited to "digital image [s],"86 "computer image [s] ,
puter-generated image[s],"88 and "drawings, cartoons, sculptures,
or paintings" are explicitly excluded from its scope.8 9 These limitations reflect that Congress is solely concerned about the danger
to the prosecution of actual child pornography cases posed by virtual child pornography, and that it is Congress's intent that
§ 2256(8)(B) not be applied to valuable art and literature. 90 Along
with a narrowing of the definition of virtual child pornography,
the PROTECT Act limits the scope of much of the sexual conduct
part and dissenting in part). The majority opinion in Free Speech, however, did
not mention the term "virtually indistinguishable."
83 S. REP. No. 108-2, at 6 (2003).
84 PROTECT Act § 502(c) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 2256(11)).
85 Congress also indicated that the government should not have to prove "that
the defendant knew or subjectively believed that the visual depiction was that of
a real minor." S. REP. No. 108-2, at 8.
86 PROTECT Act § 502(a). See H.R. REP. No. 108-66, at 60 (2003) (giving
"picture[s] or video taken with a digital camera" as examples).
87 PROTECT Act § 502(a). See H.R. REP. No. 108-66, at 60 (giving "pictures
scanned into a computer" as an example).
88 PROTECT Act § 502(a). See H.R. REP. No. 108-66, at 60 (giving "images
created or altered with the use of a computer" as an example).
89 PROTECT Act § 502(c) (stating that § 2256(8)(B) "does not apply to
depictions that are drawings, cartoons, sculptures or paintings depicting minors
or adults").
90 See PROTECT Act § 501(6); H.R. REP. No. 108-66, at 60 (stating that
"[1limiting the definition to digital, computer, or computer-generated images will
help to exclude ordinary motion pictures from the coverage of 'virtual child
pornography"'). The Court in Free Speech had specifically cited Renaissance
paintings, a film adaptation of Romeo and Juliet, and Hollywood movies
produced using adult actors as endangered under the CPPA. Ashcroft v. Free
Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234, 241, 246-247 (2002) (stating that "[tihe statute
proscribes the visual depiction of an idea - that of teenagers engaging in sexual
activity - that is a fact of modern society and has been a theme in art and
literature throughout the ages").
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that is actionable under § 2256(8)(B) to that which is "graphic." 9 1
A new section, § 2256(10), defines "graphic" as "mean[ing] that a
viewer can observe any part of the genitals or pubic area of any
depicted person or animal during any part of the time that the
sexually explicit conduct is being depicted."9 2
In addition to a narrowing of the scope of the virtual child pornography definition in § 2256(8)(B), the affirmative defense in
§ 2252A(c) has been significantly expanded in response to the
Court's view in Free Speech that the affirmative defense created in
the CPPA was "incomplete and insufficient" because it was not
available in possession cases or in cases involving virtual child
pornography.9 3 While prior law only granted an affirmative
defense for productions involving youthful looking adults and only
allowed the defense if the defendant did not pander the material
as child pornography, a defendant can now prevail simply by
showing that no children were used in the production of the
91 A new section, 2256(2)(B), which contains a definition of sexually explicit
conduct specific to § 2256(8)(B), has been added. This new definition does not
affect prosecutions under either § 2256(8)(A) or § 2256(8)(C). Section 2256(2)(B)
provides that
'sexually explicit conduct' means(i) graphic sexual intercourse, including genital-genital, oral-genital, analgenital, or oral-anal, whether between persons of the same or opposite
sex, or lascivious simulated sexual intercourse where the genitals,
breast, or pubic area of any person is exhibited;
(ii) graphic or lascivious simulated;
(I) bestiality;
(II) masturbation; or
(III) sadistic or masochistic abuse; or
(iii) graphic or simulated lascivious exhibition of the genitals or pubic area
of any person;
PROTECT Act § 502(b) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 2256(2)(B) (2003)).
92 Id. § 502(c) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 2256(10)). For sexual
conduct that is "simulated," the new provision requires that it be "lascivious." Id.
Thus, "sexually explicit conduct" must be "graphic" or if "simulated," also
"lascivious." Id. The new definition of "sexually explicit conduct" enacted by the
PROTECT Act is an attempt to further narrow the range of materials to which
new § 2256(8)(B) might apply in response to the Court's concern in Free Speech
that the former § 2256(8)(B) would proscribe, or at least threaten, movies with
simulated sexual conduct involving adults who play the role of children. Free
Speech, 535 U.S. at 246-48. Because the PROTECT Act should be interpreted as
applying only to virtual child pornography, rather than also applying to images
of adults who appear to be minors as in the CPPA, the Court's concerns about
movies involving adults are not applicable. See infra notes 110-13 and
accompanying text (explaining that § 2256(8)(B) should be interpreted as not
including images of adults who appear to be minors).
13 See 535 U.S. at 255-56.

ALB. L.J. SC. & TECH.

[Vol. 14

materials.9 4 Additionally, the affirmative defense is now available
in possession of child pornography cases. 5
In contrast to its intentions in enacting the CPPA, the government is now interested in proscribing virtual child pornography
only to the extent necessary to protect its ability to effectively
combat the trade of actual child pornography. 96 Significantly,
Congress now concedes that "[t]here is no substantial evidence
that any of the child pornography images being trafficked today
were made other than by the abuse of real children."97 Indeed,
Congress cited to "leading experts" who believe "that to the extent
that the technology exists to computer-generate realistic images of
child pornography, the cost in terms of time, money, and expertise
is-and for the foreseeable future will remain-prohibitively
expensive."98 In spite of this evidence, the Department argues
that narrowly tailored regulations of virtual child pornography
are necessary in order to protect the government's compelling
interest in ensuring that the criminal prohibitions against actual
child pornography remain enforceable and effective.9 9
Similar to its arguments in support of the CPPA, the government believes that developments in technology have made it difficult to effectively prosecute child pornography cases.' °° In
94 PROTECT Act § 502(d) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(c)). In
other words, a defendant can now prevail if the images depict adults or if the
images are virtual child pornography. The defendant must, however, provide
notice to the government of an intention to assert the affirmative defense. See 18
U.S.C. § 2252A(c).
95 See PROTECT Act § 502(d).
96 Both Congress's statements of findings and the Department of Justice's
testimony in support of the PROTECT Act focus solely on the need for "criminal
prohibitions against child pornography to remain enforceable and effective." See
PROTECT Act § 501(7)-(15); Collins, supra note 78. This intent is further
revealed by the expansion of the affirmative defense in § 2252A(c) to include
virtual child pornography. See supra notes 93-95 and accompanying text.
97 PROTECT Act § 501(7).
98 Id. § 501(11). This finding stands in stark contrast to the testimony in
support of the CPPA, where the government argued that computers and software
capable of creating "virtually indistinguishable" computer-generated child
pornography were inexpensive and readily available. See S. REP. No. 104-358, at
15-16 (1996).
99 See supra note 96; see also PROTECT Act § 501(14) (stating that to avoid
the "grave threat to the Government's unquestioned compelling interest in
effective enforcement of child pornography laws that protect real children, a
statute must be adopted that prohibits a narrowly-defined subcategory of
images").
100 Id. § 501 (expressing concerns that developments in technology will make
it impossible for the government to meet its burden of proof in child pornography
cases).
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addition to the future probability that virtual child pornography
will be produced, the government is concerned about the ability of
defendants to contend that there is "reasonable doubt" as to
whether a given computer image depicts an actual child.' 1° The
government fears that defendants will be aided in their claims by
already existing technology that is able to "disguise depictions of
real children to make them unidentifiable and to make depictions
of real children appear computer-generated." 1°2 Because most
prosecutions involve materials stored and exchanged on computers, the government believes that without some restrictions on
virtual child pornography it may be able to successfully prosecute
only in very limited cases, such as those in which it is able to
match the depictions to pictures in pornographic magazines produced before the development of computer imaging software or in
which it can establish the identity of the victim. 10 3
101 Id.
§ 501(10) (stating that since Free Speech "defendants in child
pornography cases have almost universally raised the contention that the images
in question could be virtual" and "some of the defense efforts have been
successful"); id. § 501(13) (asserting that "[tihe mere prospect that the
technology exists to create composite or computer-generated depictions that are
indistinguishable from depictions of real children will allow defendants who
possess images of real children to escape prosecution; for it threatens to create a
reasonable doubt in every case of computer images even when a real child was
abused"). Congress also expressed this concern when enacting the CPPA. S.
REP. No. 104-358, at 16-17 (stating that the existence of virtual child
pornography gives defendants a "built-in reasonable doubt argument" in every
child pornography case).
102 PROTECT Act §§ 501(5), 501(11). The government fears that "experts...
[will be] willing to testify" on behalf of defendants and "trials will increasingly
devolve into jury-confusing battles of experts arguing over the method of
generating an image that, to all appearances, looks like it is the real thing." See
Collins, supra note 78.
103 See PROTECT Act § 501(8) (stating that because "an image seized from a
collector of child pornography is rarely a first-generation product and the
retransmission of images [over the Internet] can alter the image, [it is] difficult
for experts to [conclusively] opine that a particular image depicts a real child");
see also Collins, supra note 78 (discussing the possible ways for prosecutors to
prove that an image depicts an actual child). In addition, the Department of
Justice is concerned about the chilling effect the Free Speech decision has had on
federal prosecutors. See Collins, supra note 78. Throughout the country, and
especially in the Ninth Circuit, many prosecutors have been reluctant to bring
cases where they are unable to produce direct evidence that actual children are
depicted, and this hesitation has caused many otherwise viable cases to remain
unprosecuted. See Collins, supra note 78; see also PROTECT Act § 501(9)
(stating that after Free Speech "prosecutions generally have been brought in the
Ninth Circuit only in the most clear-cut cases in which the government can
specifically identify the child in the depiction or otherwise identify the origin of
the image," and that "[t]his is a fraction of meritorious child pornography cases").
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IV.

ANALYSIS OF THE

PROTECT

ACT

The PROTECT Act responds to many of the concerns expressed
in Free Speech about the former definition in § 2256(8)(B) and
focuses federal child pornography law more narrowly on the government's compelling interest in preserving its ability to enforce
laws concerning child pornography produced using actual children.1" 4 Despite the changes made by the PROTECT Act, the
most controversial aspect of the CPPA is still present in
§ 2256(8)(B) because the provision still encompasses virtual child
pornography images. 10 5 In order to determine whether the PROTECT Act's virtual child pornography provisions are constitutional, it is necessary to examine the virtual child pornography
definition in § 2256(8)(B) separately from the affirmative defense
104 Unlike the provision struck down in Free Speech, the new definition in §
2256(8)(B) is limited to "digital," "computer," or "computer-generated image[s],"
the images must be "indistinguishable from" images depicting actual children,
and the sexual content must be particularly "explicit." See supra notes 78-92 and
accompanying text.
105 Similar to the CPPA litigation, there will likely be challenges to the
language in § 2256(8)(B) based on vagueness and ambiguity. See, e.g., Eric M.
Freedman, Digitized Pornography Meets the First Amendment, 23 CARDOZO L.
REV. 2011, 2017 (2002) (citing to the Ninth Circuit's decision in Free Speech
claiming that the term "virtually indistinguishable" would be "hopelessly
vague"). Unlike the CPPA, the PROTECT Act provides guidance regarding the
term "indistinguishable" and provides that a virtual child pornography image is
"indistinguishable" from an actual child pornography image if "an ordinary
person viewing the depiction would conclude that the depiction is of an actual
child pornography image." See supra note 82 and accompanying text. The
terminology in § 2256(8)(B) is not vaguer than the language used in many other
criminal statutes, such as the federal obscenity statutes, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1460-70,
and would seem amenable to limiting constructions if needed. One argument
made in Free Speech, and likely to be repeated in a challenge to the PROTECT
Act, is that a virtual child pornography provision is unworkable because it is
impossible to determine the age of a virtual minor. See Brief for Respondent at
45-49, Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 122 S. Ct. 1389 (9th Cir. 2001) (No. 00795), availableat 2001 WL 747841. That argument should not succeed, however.
In many, if not most, child pornography cases involving actual children, the
government does not know the identity of the children and must prove the age of
the children through methods such as allowing the jury itself to determine the
age of the children or calling a pediatrician to give an expert opinion that, based
solely on the images, minors are depicted. See, e.g., United States v. Bender, 290
F.3d 1279, 1282 (11th Cir. 2002) (describing a pediatrician testifying as an expert
witness and estimating the age of the children depicted based solely on the
depictions themselves). In any case, examining whether the language in the
PROTECT Act is unconstitutionally vague is beyond the scope of this Article. It
is likely that any unconstitutional vagueness in the PROTECT Act could be
remedied in a future statute, and thus this Article focuses on whether the
PROTECT Act, or any other virtual child pornography statute, is
unconstitutional for other reasons.
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in § 2252A(c). If the virtual child pornography definition is constitutional, it is unnecessary to examine the affirmative defense in
§ 2252A(c) to determine whether it can save § 2256(8)(B) from
being struck down. On the other hand, if it is unconstitutional to
proscribe virtual child pornography, the focus should shift to
whether an affirmative defense, exonerating the defendant if the
images do not depict actual children, is sufficient to render the
statutory scheme constitutional. Thus, section A of this Part
examines whether it is constitutional to proscribe virtual child
pornography and, concluding that it is not constitutional, section
B examines, and rejects, the argument that the affirmative
defense in § 2252A(C) can save § 2256(8)(B) from being struck
down as unconstitutional.
A.

The PROTECT Act's Provision ProscribingVirtual Child
Pornography is Unconstitutional

It is well-established that the government has a "compelling
interest" in proscribing actual child pornography. 11 6 Despite this
compelling interest, the government will not be able to defend
§ 2256(8)(B) on the basis that virtual child pornography is within
the child pornography exception to the First Amendment.1 "7 The
Court in Free Speech held that computer-generated images are
not child pornography because they do not involve actual children
in their production, and a narrower prohibition of virtual child
pornography than was present in the CPPA's provisions would
still not comply with that standard.' 08 Thus, the child pornography exception to the First Amendment is inapplicable in determining whether § 2256(8)(B) is constitutional. 10 9
See New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 756-57 (1982).
See supra notes 22-33 and accompanying text (describing the creation of
the child pornography exception to the First Amendment).
108 See Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234, 249-51 (2002)
(explaining that Ferber does not "support a statute which eliminates the
distinction" "between actual and virtual child pornography" and attempts to fit
both within the First Amendment exception).
109 Similar to the CPPA, the obscenity exception to the First Amendment is
also not applicable in defending new § 2256(8)(B). See id. at 249 (stating that
the "CPPA cannot be read to prohibit obscenity, because it lacks the required link
between its prohibitions and the affront to community standards prohibited by
the definition of obscenity"). In contrast to § 2256(8)(B), the PROTECT Act
created a new provision, 18 U.S.C. § 1466A, prohibiting "sexually explicit"
images of children - whether real or virtual - which it attempts to defend as an
obscenity provision. See infra notes 238-44 and accompanying text.
106
107
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With the child pornography exception not available, the government will have to survive strict scrutiny of § 2256(8)(B) by establishing that it has a "narrowly drawn," compelling justification for
1 ° One initial problem with
the prohibition of protected speech.1
the new definition in § 2256(8)(B) is that the phrase "indistinguishable from [ ] that of a minor" could be interpreted, similar to
the phrase "appears to be [ ] of a minor" in former § 2256(8)(B), as
encompassing images depicting adults who look as though they
are minors."' The legislative history of the PROTECT Act,
though, indicates that Congress was solely concerned with virtual
child pornography. 1 1 2 Undoubtedly, Congress believes that
images of young looking adults do not threaten the effective prosecution of actual child pornography cases in the same way as do
computer-generated images of minors. Section 2256(8)(B) was not
intended to include images of "adults who look like" children
within its definition, and the statute should be narrowly conprove that images depict
strued to require that the government
3
minors, whether real or virtual."
See Free Speech, 535 U.S. at 262-63 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (explicitly analyzing the CPPA under the strict scrutiny
standard); Free Speech Coalition v. Reno, 198 F.3d 1083, 1091 (9th Cir. 1999)
(applying strict scrutiny analysis to the CPPA); see also Republican Party of
Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 774-75 (2002) (stating that "under the strict
scrutiny test, [the government] has the burden of proving that the [provision] is
(1) narrowly tailored, to serve (2) a compelling state interest").
I" In Free Speech, the Court stated that the CPPA "prohibits, in specific
circumstances, possessing or distributing ... images, which may be created by
using adults who look like minors or by using computer imaging." 535 U.S. at
239-40. In order for an image to be "indistinguishable from [ ] that of a minor"
under new § 2256(8)(B), all that is required is that "an ordinary person viewing
the depiction [must] conclude that the depiction is of an actual minor engaged in
sexually explicit conduct." See supra note 84 and accompanying text. In the
absence of specific evidence about the individual depicted, it seems likely that in
some cases an "ordinary person" would conclude that an image of an actual adult
was instead an image of an actual minor.
112 See supra notes 96-103 and accompanying text (explaining that in passing
the PROTECT Act Congress was concerned only with virtual child pornography
and not images of young looking adults).
113 This interpretation would certainly not be a stretch. Section 2256(1) states
that the term "'minor' means any person under the age of eighteen years[ ]."
Thus, the term "indistinguishable from [ I that of a minor" can be interpreted as
meaning that the government has to prove that the person depicted is a minor,
whether actual or virtual. Cf supra note 105 (explaining how the government
can prove that a virtual person is a minor). In Free Speech, Chief Justice
Rehnquist argued that former § 2256(8)(B) should not be interpreted as
including young adult pornography. 535 U.S. at 270 (Rehnquist, C.J.,
dissenting). Chief Justice Rehnquist is correct that Congress indicated that the
CPPA was not intended to apply to depictions produced using adults. See S. REP.
110
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Even if § 2256(8)(B) is construed as applying only to minors, the
government will likely have to convince the Court that, contrary
to the Court's statements in Free Speech, "[t]he Government
may... suppress lawful speech as a means to suppress unlawful
speech."1 1 4 An unusual aspect of § 2256(8)(B), though, is that it is
an attempt by Congress to proscribe speech that, in its view at
least, does not exist." 5 Unlike the case with a prohibition of
images of adults who appear to be minors, it is difficult to argue
that a proscription of speech that does not (yet) exist chills the
protected speech rights of anyone." 6 Nevertheless, even if the
Court reconsiders its view that virtual child pornography cannot
be banned in order to enable the government to effectively prosecute actual child pornography, the government will likely find it
difficult to establish that it cannot effectively prosecute actual
child pornography cases.
No. 104-358, at 21. Congress did explicitly state, however, that such images
were proscribed if the defendant pandered the material as child pornography.
See id. at 16-17 (pointing to the affirmative defense in former § 2252A(c) which
allowed a defendant to escape conviction if the material in question was produced
using adults and was not pandered as child pornography). Unlike former
§ 2252A(c), new § 2252A(c) provides an affirmative defense if the material was
produced using adults, regardless of whether it is pandered as child
pornography. Id. at 41. The use of the term "affirmative defense" in § 2252A(c)
does imply that young adult pornography falls within § 2256(8)(B) if it is
"indistinguishable from" child pornography. See infra note 137 (explaining that
.an 'affirmative defense' assumes that the elements of the crime have
been
satisfied and raises other facts which.., would establish a justification to engage
in the conduct in question"). Such an interpretation, however, would be contrary
to congressional intent and is not required.
114 Recall that in Free Speech the Court rejected the government's arguments
that a ban on virtual child pornography was constitutional because without such
a ban it could not effectively prosecute actual child pornography cases, stating
that "[tihe Government may not suppress lawful speech as a means to suppress
unlawful speech." See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
115 See supra notes 97-98 and accompanying text (explaining that Congress
believes that the production of computer-generated images of minors is not yet
possible). Undoubtedly, in addition to virtual child pornography cases,
§ 2256(8)(B) could also be used to prosecute cases involving images that have
been manipulated to make the actual children appear computer-generated, to
disguise the identity of the actual children, or to turn innocent images of children
into ones that are sexually explicit. See supra notes 100-103 and accompanying
text. These types of images, however, are already unlawful under
§§ 2556(8)(A),(C). Thus, the only otherwise protected speech proscribed under
§ 2256(8)(B) is virtual child pornography.
116 Cf Free Speech, 535 U.S. at 244 (stating that because of the "severe"
penalties enacted by the CPPA, "few legitimate movie producers or book
publishers, or few other speakers in any capacity, would risk distributing images
in or near the uncertain reach of this law").
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The government argues that it has suffered "adverse judgments" as a result of the assertion of "virtual child [pornography]
defense[s]," but the reality is that the government has been quite
successful since the Free Speech decision in meeting its burden of
establishing that images depict actual children.1 17 For example,
courts have held that there was "sufficient evidence" that the
images depicted actual children in cases where a pediatric expert
testified as to the age of the child depicted and "that the photographs appeared to portray real children;" 1 8 where an FBI agent
testified at trial that "based on his training and [ I experience...
the images depicted actual children," and the judges' own viewing
of the images left "no doubt" in their minds that the images
depicted real children; 19 where the government introduced expert
testimony that the images of child pornography did not appear to
be altered and that completely realistic, computer-generated
images of humans were not yet possible; 120 and where the government established that the images were published "before computer 'morphing' technology was available."1 2 '
Even more significantly, although the First Circuit has held
that such evidence by itself is insufficient to meet the government's burden of proof, every other circuit that has considered the
issue has held that the government can meet its burden of proof
by merely introducing the images into evidence and allowing the
22
factfinder to conclude that the images depict actual children.
1'7 See John P. Feldmeier, Close Enough for Government Work: An
Examination of Congressional Efforts to Reduce the Government's Burden of
Proofin Child PornographyCases, 30 N. Ky. L. REV. 205, 220-23 (2003) (showing
"that the 'virtual child' defense has not been [ I successful" in any cases either
before or after the Free Speech decision).
118 See United States v. Bender, 290 F.3d 1279, 1282 n.2 (11th Cir. 2002)
(denying defendant's Free Speech claim and noting that "there [was] sufficient
evidence that the images portray[ed] real children"). But see United States v.
Hilton, 363 F.3d 58, 64-66 (1st Cir. 2004) (holding that a doctor's testimony that
an image looks as though it depicts an actual child based on the physical
characteristics of the child in the image is not sufficient evidence that the image
depicts an actual child).
119 See United States v. Richardson, 304 F.3d 1061, 1065 (11th Cir. 2002).
120 See United States v. Rearden, 349 F.3d 608, 613-14 (9th Cir. 2003).
121 See United States v. Guagliardo, 278 F.3d 868, 871-72 (9th Cir. 2002).
122 Compare Hilton, 363 F.3d at 64 (holding that the government "must
introduce relevant evidence in addition to the images to prove the children are
real"); United States v. Sims, 220 F. Supp. 2d 1222, 1227 (D.N.M. 2002)
(reversing conviction under § 2252(a) where the government put forth no
evidence that the images depicted actual minors and objected to the notion that
it was required to do so even though such evidence was available), with United
States v. Slanina, 359 F.3d. 356, 357 (5th Cir. 2004) (stating that "the
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For example, in United States v. Kimler, the Tenth Circuit
rejected the argument that the government is "require [d] to either
produce direct evidence of the identity of [the] children in the []
images or expert testimony that the images depicted are those of
real children rather than computer-generated 'virtual' children."1 2 3 The court held that because imaging technology has not
advanced to the point where "indistinguishable" images are possible, "Uluries are still capable of distinguishing between real and
virtual images . "..
124
Government was not required to present expert testimony, or any other evidence
in addition to the images themselves in order to meet its burden of proof");
United States v. Fuller, 77 Fed. Appx. 371, 380 (6th Cir. 2003); United States v.
Kimler, 335 F.3d 1132, 1142 (10th Cir. 2003); United States v. Deaton, 328 F.3d
454, 455 (8th Cir. 2003) (stating that the government is not required to put forth
affirmative evidence that children were not computer-generated and indicated
that the images themselves were sufficient evidence at both trial and sentencing
to prove actual minors); United States v. Hall, 312 F.3d 1250, 1260 (11th Cir.
2002) (holding, based on an examination of the images by the court, that the
children depicted in the images were real and no reasonable jury could have
found that the images were of virtual children); United States v. Vig, 167 F.3d
443, 449 (8th Cir. 1999) (holding that "[tihe images were viewed by the jury
which was in a position to draw its own independent conclusion as to whether
real children were depicted"); United States v. Oakes, 224 F. Supp. 2d 296, 301302 (D. Me. 2002) (holding, based on an examination of the images by the court,
that the defendant did not meet the standard of establishing "actual innocence").
123 See Kimler, 335 F.3d at 1140.
124 Id. at 1142. The issue of whether virtual child pornography exists is, of
course, dispositive of whether the government should be required to introduce
evidence other than the images at issue in order to obtain a conviction. The First
Circuit in Hilton "recognize[d] that the vast technological revolution underway
since 1987 . . . has made undeniable the fact that sexually explicit images
portraying children can be produced by artificial means .... " 363 F.3d at 64-65.
The court thus held that because virtual child pornography exists, juries are not
able to identify actual child pornography based on the images themselves, and
the government must therefore produce additional evidence that the images
depict actual minors. See id. at 64. In contrast, because the Tenth Circuit found
that virtual child pornography is not yet available, it held that juries are still
able to identify actual child pornography based solely on the images, and the
government can meet its burden of proof by introducing the images into evidence
and allowing the jury to conclude that they depict actual children. See Kimler,
335 F.3d at 1140-42. The First Circuit's "undeniable" fact that virtual child
pornography is currently capable of being produced is not so undeniable, as
Congress found when enacting the PROTECT Act. See supra note 98 (finding
that it is not yet feasible to produce virtual child pornography). Nonetheless,
although it may be debatable whether virtual child pornography exists, the First
Circuit's decision does not necessarily mean that the government will start losing
child pornography cases in the First Circuit. The First Circuit merely held that
the government has to produce evidence other than the images at issue in order
to meet its burden of proof and indicated that the government has various
options to choose from in meeting its burden, including the introduction of
evidence establishing the identity of a depicted child or testimony of a computer
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Currently, the government is quite successful in prosecuting
child pornography cases,"' and the PROTECT Act, similar to the
CPPA, can be viewed as an attempt by Congress to address a
problem that has not yet materialized. Congress, however, also
defends the PROTECT Act as a reasonable response to predicted
future harm because child pornography prosecutions will not be
possible once technology advances so that "virtually indistinguishable" computer-generated images are available. 12 6 The problem
with this argument is that the government is essentially asking
the Court to uphold a statute unnecessarily proscribing protected
speech on the basis that in the future the statute may be necessary.1 27 Even Justice Thomas, who argued that if technological
advances made it impossible to prosecute actual child pornography the government may have a "compelling interest in barring or
otherwise regulating" virtual child pornography, indicated in Free
Speech that the government would not have a compelling interest
until technological advances actually made it difficult to prosecute
actual child pornography.1 28 Thus, even if the Court reconsiders
its belief that the government may not suppress lawful speech as a
means to suppress unlawful speech, given the government's
graphics expert. 363 F.3d at 65, 65 n.6. Thus, it is premature to conclude that
the First Circuit's decision will result in the government no longer being able to
meet its burden of proving that images depict actual minors. See infra Part VI.
(discussing the government's alternatives in the event that it becomes unable to
meet its burden of proving that images depict actual children).
125 See supra notes 118-25 and accompanying text.
126 See S. REP. No. 108-2, at 4-5 (2003).
127 Even if technology advances to the point where virtual child pornography
can be produced, at this point it is hard to predict whether such technology will
render experts incapable of identifying computer-generated images or whether,
in the future, the government will have developed effective ways of identifying
actual children. See infra note 202 and accompanying text (suggesting that the
government has the ability to keep a data base of known victims of child
pornography that it can use to establish that a particular image depicts an actual
child).
128 See Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234, 259-60 (2002)
(Thomas, J., concurring). Justice Thomas noted that "the Government asserts
only that defendants raise such defenses, not that they have done so
successfully." Id. at 259. Justice Thomas reasoned that
[wihile this speculative interest cannot support the broad reach of the CPPA,
technology may evolve to the point where it becomes impossible to enforce
actual child pornography laws because the Government cannot prove that
certain pornographic images are of real children. In the event this occurs,
the Government should not be foreclosed from enacting a regulation of
virtual child pornography that contains an appropriate affirmative defense
or some other narrowly drawn restriction.
Id.
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inability to show that it can no longer prosecute child pornography
cases effectively, it seems unlikely that the Court would uphold a
provision that criminalized virtual child pornography.
B.

The Affirmative Defense Created by the PROTECT Act
Cannot Save the Virtual Child PornographyProvision
From Being Struck Down
Having established in Part IV.A. that § 2256(8)(B) cannot withstand strict scrutiny on its own, this section explores whether the
affirmative defense in § 2252A(c), exonerating a defendant if the
image in question does not depict an actual minor, can save
§ 2256(8)(B) from being struck down yet again. 1 29 Notwithstanding Justice Thomas' concurring opinion in Free Speech suggesting
that a complete affirmative defense could save the constitutionality of a virtual child pornography provision, the Court correctly
recognized that placing the burden on the defendant to prove that
an image does not depict an actual child raises serious constitutional issues. 130 This section first describes the Court's burden of
proof decisions, which hold that the government is required to
bear the burden of proof for all elements of an offense. In light of
these decisions, this section goes on to explain why the government must bear the burden of proof of establishing that an image
depicts a minor and cannot require the defendant to prove that an
image does not depict a minor or even to produce evidence that an
image does not depict a minor.
1.

The Supreme Court's Burden of Proof Jurisprudence
The principle that the government must prove all of the elements of a crime is well-established. In In re Winship,' 3 ' reflecting what had been the general consensus on the constitutional
requirements of due process, the Court held that "the Due Process
Clause protects the accused against conviction except upon proof
beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute
the crime ... charged."1 3 2 The Court followed its decision in Winship by holding, in Mullaney v. Wilbur, 3 3 that the government
129 See supra notes 105-28 and accompanying text.

See supra notes 65-68 and accompanying text.
397 U.S. 358 (1970).
Id. at 364. The Court reasoned that the reasonable doubt standard
ensures that "the moral force of the criminal law [will] not be diluted by a
standard of proof that leaves people in doubt whether innocent men are being
condemned." Id.
133 421 U.S. 684 (1975).
130
131
132
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may not shift the burden of proof on an element of the offense to
the defendant."' In Mullaney, the Court declared Maine's murder statute unconstitutional because it presumed an essential element of the murder offense, malice, and shifted to the defendant
the burden of rebutting the presumed element.1 3 5 The Court reasoned that Maine violated Winship by distinguishing between
murder and manslaughter on the basis of heat of passion but not
requiring the prosecution to prove that element beyond a reasona1 36
ble doubt.
The Mullaney decision created great controversy because of the
possibility that its implications would render all affirmative
3
defenses unconstitutional. 1 37 In Patterson v. New York, ' howSee id. at 703-04.
See id. at 685-87. At issue in Mullaney was a Maine homicide statute
which provided that "if the prosecution established that the homicide was both
intentional and unlawful, malice aforethought [an essential element of the
offense of murder] would be conclusively implied. . . ." See id. If, however, "the
defendant proved by a fair preponderance of the evidence that he acted... in the
heat of passion, on sudden provocation, without express or implied malice
aforethought," the crime would be "reduce [d] from murder to manslaughter." See
id. at 686 n.3.
136 See id. at 698. The Court also stated that if Winship were limited to those
facts that constitute a crime as defined by state law, a state could evade the
decision by either redefining the elements that constitute different crimes and
recharacterize them as sentencing factors or could, in the case of assaults for
example, define all assaults as a single offense and then require the defendant to
disprove the elements of aggravation. See id. at 699 n.24.
137 See The Supreme Court, 2001 Term-Leading Cases, 116 HARv. L. REV.
200, 239-40 (2002) [hereinafter Leading Cases]; Ronald J. Allen, The Restoration
of In re Winship: A Comment on Burdens of Persuasionin Criminal Cases After
Patterson v. New York, 76 MIcH. L. REV. 30, 34 (1977) (stating that Mullaney
"had clearly appeared to herald the end of affirmative defenses in the criminal
law"); Scott E. Sundby, The Reasonable Doubt Rule and the Meaning of
Innocence, 40 HASTINGS L. J. 457, 469 (1989) (stating that "[b]y evincing a
willingness to look beyond the state's designation of who bore the burden of
persuasion, the Court had raised a 'Mullaney question' regarding any factor
significantly affecting the defendant's conviction and punishment"). An
"affirmative defense assumes" that the elements of the crime have been satisfied
and "raises other facts that, if true, would establish [ ] a justification . . . to
engage in the conduct in question," while a non-affirmative defense negates an
element of the offense. Leslie Yalof Garfield, Back to the Future:Does Apprendi
Bar a Legislature'sPower to Shift the Burden of ProofAway From the Prosecution
by Labeling an Element of a Traditional Crime as an Affirmative Defense?, 35
CONN. L. REV. 1351, 1357 n.33 (2003). While the Mullaney decision clearly held
that a defendant cannot be required to bear the burden of proof for a defense that
negates an element of the offense, it was less clear whether the decision also
meant that a defendant cannot be required to bear the burden of proof for a
defense that does not negate an element of the offense.
138 432 U.S. 197 (1977).
134
135
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ever, the Court held that it is constitutional to place the burden of
proof for an affirmative defense on a defendant and interpreted
the Mullaney decision as only establishing that a criminal statute
may not be applied in such a way that an essential element of a
charged crime is presumed, leaving a defendant with the burden
of proof in demonstrating the absence of the element in order to
qualify for a less serious offense. 139 The Court reasoned that
"[tlhe Due Process Clause requires the prosecution to prove
beyond a reasonable doubt all of the elements included in the definition of the offense of which the defendant is charged. Proof of
the nonexistence of all affirmative defenses has never been constitutionally required ....
140
In upholding the New York statute, the Court reasoned that
unlike the statute at issue in Mullaney, malice was not an element of the New York statute, and the statute thus did not presume any essential element of the crime charged and did not
require the defendant to prove the nonexistence of an essential
element of the crime.1 4 ' In the Court's view, the distinction was
crucial because the government is not required to "prove beyond a
reasonable doubt every fact, the existence or nonexistence of
which it is willing to recognize as an exculpatory or mitigating circumstance affecting the degree of culpability or the severity of the

Id. at 214-15.
Id. at 210. The Court explained that "[t]here is some language in Mullaney
that has been understood as perhaps construing the Due Process Clause to
require the prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable doubt any fact affecting 'the
degree of criminal culpability'.... The Court did not intend Mullaney to have
such far-reaching effect." Id. at 214 n.15 (citations omitted). The Court did,
however, reaffirm the principle that "any shifting of the burden of persuasion" on
an element of a crime is "impermissible under the Due Process Clause." Id. at
215.
141 See id. at 215-16. Under the New York homicide statute, malice was
not
an element of second degree murder, but a defendant could reduce a second
degree murder charge to manslaughter by proving by a preponderance of the
evidence that his actions resulted from an "extreme emotional disturbance for
which there was a reasonable explanation or excuse." Patterson, 432 U.S. 197,
198 (1977) (citing N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.25 (McKinney 1975)). The Court noted
that
[t]he crime of murder is defined by the statute . . . as causing the death of
another person with intent to do so. The death, the intent to kill, and
causation are the facts that the State is required to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt ....
No further facts are either presumed or inferred in
order to constitute the crime.
Id. at 205-06.
139

140
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punishment." 14 2 The Court thus allowed legislatures great latitude in defining the elements of an offense with only the limitation that "there are obviously constitutional limits beyond which
141
the [government] may not go" in defining those elements.
While the Court indicated that it must be "within [the government's] constitutional powers to sanction by substantial punishment" the conduct described in the elements of the offense, it
provided little guidance as to where the constitutional line is
drawn. 144
142 Id. at 207. Expansive proceduralists disagree with the Court's decision in
Patterson and argue that the reasonable doubt rule should attach to every fact
affecting the defendant's criminal liability under the legislative scheme,
including the absence of defenses. See, e.g., Donald A. Dripps, The
ConstitutionalStatus of the Reasonable Doubt Rule, 75 CAL. L. REV. 1665 (1987)
(arguing "that due process should require the government to establish every fact
that under the applicable statutes gives rise to a distinctive range of criminal
punishments, regardless of whether a fact negates an element of the offense or
establishes an affirmative defense"); Stephen Saltzburg, Burdens of Persuasion
in Criminal Cases: Harmonizing the Views of the Justices, 20 Am. CRIM. L. REV.
393 (1983) (arguing "that due process requires the government to bear the
burden of proving any element of a crime that compounds the defendant's
stigmatization and blameworthiness").
143 Patterson, 432 U.S. at 210.
144 Id. at 208. The Court provided one example that would be
unconstitutional: a legislature may not enact a criminal statute that eliminates a
defendant's presumption of innocence when charged with a particular crime. Id.
at 210. Although the Court has identified some constitutional limits on
legislatures' ability to define crimes, it has not developed a comprehensive
constitutional standard for determining those limits. See Almendarez-Torres v.
United States, 523 U.S. 224, 228 (1998) (stating that, "within limits, the question
of which facts are" essential elements of a crime and which are only sentencing
factors is "normally a matter for Congress"); McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S.
79, 86 (1986) (noting that the Court had "never attempted to define precisely the
constitutional limits noted in Patterson, i.e., the extent to which due process
forbids the reallocation or reduction of burdens of proof in criminal cases, and do
not do so today"); see also Jeffrey Standen, The End of the Era of Sentencing
Guidelines: Apprendi v. New Jersey, 87 IowA L. REV. 775, 782 (2002) (stating,
[tihe Court... has never held that the Constitution requires legislatures to
define crimes in any particular way. Instead, the Court has contented itself
with elaborating constitutional doctrines that limit the ability of legislatures
to shift burdens of proof, create factual presumptions, convert elements to
sentencing factors, or recharacterize elements of crimes as affirmative
defenses);
Note, Awaiting the Mikado: Limiting Legislative Discretion to Define Criminal
Elements and Sentencing Factors, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1349, 1353 (1999) (stating
that "the Court [has] provided little guidance ... other than ...

asserting ...

that

an individual may not be declared presumptively guilty of a crime and that a
statute may not offend a deeply rooted principle of justice"); Note, Winship on
Rough Waters: The Erosion of the Reasonable Doubt Standard, 106 HARv. L. REV.
1093, 1096 (1993) (stating "that the Court has been quite deferential to
legislative determinations of. . . the elements of an offense" and, "[c]onsequently,
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Following the Winship, Mullaney and Patterson decisions, the
essential elements of a crime, as defined by the legislature, could
not be presumed to exist and had to be proven beyond a reasonable doubt by the prosecution, but the burden of proof for affirmative defenses could be placed on the defendant. In Martin v.
Ohio,"' the Court further extended the Patterson decision by
upholding a provision which placed on the defendant in a murder
prosecution the burden of proving that the killing was in selfdefense even though one of the elements of self-defense tended to
negate the offense element of prior calculation and design. The
Court held that due process is not violated "simply because" proof
of an affirmative defense may tend to negate an element of the
crime. 146 As one scholar has observed, "[a]fter Martin, it was
clear that virtually any legislative shifting of any item from the
category of 'element of the crime' to the category of 'affirmative
defense' would, at least if clearly expressed in the statute, pass
constitutional muster."1 4 7
Reversing course from the jurisprudence that produced Patterson and Martin, the Court has recently revisited the issue of the
scope of a legislature's power to define the elements of an
offense.1 48 In Apprendi v. New Jersey,'4 9 "for the first time, the
Court [ I rejected a legislature's carefully considered decision
about whether [ I a particular factor should be treated as an 'elelegislatures can dilute the impact of Winship by simply removing elements from
the definition of a given offense"); Nelson E. Roth & Scott E. Sundby, The Felony
Murder Rule: A Doctrine at ConstitutionalCrossroads, 70 CORNELL L. REV. 446,
465 (1985).
145 480 U.S. 228 (1987).
146 Id. at 234. The Court also rejected the argument that "because selfdefense renders lawful what would otherwise be a crime, unlawfulness is an
element of the offense that the state must prove by disproving self-defense" by
stating that Ohio courts had held that "unlawfulness" was established through
proving the elements of aggravated murder. Id. at 235.
147 Joseph L. Hoffmann, Apprendi v. New Jersey: Back to the Future?, 38 AM.
CRIM. L. REv. 255, 273 (2001). See Martin, 480 U.S. at 239 (Powell, J.,
dissenting) (asserting that "[tihe Court thus seem[ed] to conclude that as long as
the jury is told that the State has the burden of proving all elements of the crime,
the overlap between the offense and defense is immaterial"); see also Rhodes v.
Brigano, 91 F.3d 803, 807-08 (6th Cir. 1996) (stating that "due process is not
violated simply because proof of an affirmative defense... may tend to negate an
element of the crime charged").
148 See Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 468-69 (2000) (questioning
whether a New Jersey statute could allow the trial judge to make a factual
determination increasing a maximum sentence imposed by another statute).
149 See id.
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ment of the crime.' ' 150 The Court overturned a sentence where
the defendant had been sentenced under a "'hate crime' law
[which] provid[ed] for an 'extended term' of imprisonment if the
trial judge [found], by a preponderance of the evidence, that the
defendant" had violated the hate crime statute.'
In finding that
the application of the hate crime law improperly increased the
defendant's sentence beyond the statutory maximum of the underlying firearm conviction, the Court stated that "[o]ther than the
fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a
crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt."' 5 2 The
Court reasoned that "the Due Process Clause protects the accused
against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of
every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is
charged," "[and a legislature may not] circumvent the protections
of [the Due Process Clause] 'merely by redefin[ing] the elements
that constitute different crimes, characterizing them as factors
that bear solely on the extent of punishment."" 5 3
Some scholars have interpreted Apprendi broadly and have
argued that the decision offers a basis for a return to an interpretation of Mullaney that the reasonable doubt rule attaches to
every fact affecting the defendant's criminal liability, and thus a
legislature can no longer shift the burden of proving an affirmaHoffmann, supra note 147, at 264.
530 U.S. at 468-69 (referencing N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:44-3(e)
(West Supp. 1995)).
152 Id.
at 490. The Court's decision in Apprendi followed several related
decisions. In McMillan v. Pennsylvania, the Court held that the preponderance
of evidence standard may be used when considering a sentencing factor. 477
U.S. 79, 91 (1986). The Court noted that "Pattersonstressed that in determining
what facts must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt the state legislature's
definition of the elements of the offense is usually dispositive." Id. at 85.
Similarly, in Almendarez-Torres v. United States, the Court held that the
existence of the defendant's prior conviction did not have to be determined by the
jury because "Congress intended to [designate that fact as] a sentencing factor"
rather than an element of a crime. 523 U.S. 224, 235 (1998). However, in Jones
v. United States, the Court held that "any fact (other than prior conviction) that
increases the maximum penalty for a crime must be charged in an indictment
and proved beyond a reasonable doubt" by a jury. 526 U.S. 227, 243 n.6 (1999).
The Court reasoned that a legislature cannot relieve the government of proving
beyond a reasonable doubt an "essential ingredient of the offense." Id. at 241.
153 Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 485 (quoting Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 698
(1975)). The Court noted that "Patterson made clear that the state law still
required the State to prove every element of that State's offense of murder and
its accompanying punishment." Id. at 485 n. 12.
150

151 Apprendi,
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tive defense to the defendant.1 5 4 Nothing in the Court's opinion in
Apprendi, however, indicated that affirmative defenses are unconstitutional. 15 In addition, lower courts have interpreted
Apprendi as not intending to alter the ability of legislatures to
place the burden of proving affirmative defenses on the defendant. 156 Nevertheless, the Court has not limited the reach of
Apprendi with regard to Sixth Amendment rights in sentencing.1 5 7 Thus, the Apprendi decision does represent a retreat by
the Court from its view that the legislature should be given con154 See Garfield, supra note 137, at 1354-56. In her dissent in Apprendi,
Justice O'Connor insisted that the Court's decision would require it "to overrule,
at a minimum, [a] decision[] like Patterson." Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 544
(O'Connor, J., dissenting); see also Susan R. Klein & Jordan M. Steiker, The
Search for Equality in CriminalSentencing, 2002 Sup. CT. REV. 223, 251 (stating
that the fact "[tihat Patterson may have committed his homicide under the
influence of extreme emotional distress, subjecting him to a manslaughter rather
than a murder penalty, clearly changed the 'range of punishments to which the
prosecution is by law entitled'").
155 The Court made clear that the "case . . . [did] not raise any questions
concerning the State's power to . . .plac[e] the affirmative defense label on 'at
least some elements' of traditional crimes." Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 475; see also
id. at 485 n.12 (discussing Patterson but not indicating disagreement with the
decision); id. at 501 (Thomas, J., concurring) (stating "that a 'crime' includes
every fact that is by law a basis for imposing or increasing punishment (in
contrast with a fact that mitigates punishment)").
156 See, e.g., United States v. Williams, 308 F.3d 833 (8th Cir. 2002); United
States v. Tinoco, 304 F.3d 1088, 1106 (11th Cir. 2002); United States v.
Bradshaw, 281 F.3d 278, 296 (1st Cir. 2002); United States v. Brown, 276 F.3d
930, 932 (7th Cir. 2002) (claiming that "Apprendi leaves undisturbed the
principle that while the prosecution must indeed prove all the elements of the
offense charged beyond a reasonable doubt, . . .the legislation creating the
offense can place the burden of proving affirmative defenses on the defendant").
157 Soon after Apprendi it appeared as though the Court preferred a narrow
interpretation of the decision, holding that the Constitution does not require that
facts that "trigger [ I mandatory minimum" sentences be "submitted to the jury
or proved beyond a reasonable doubt." Harris v. United States, 536 U.S. 545,
571-72 (2002); see also Leading Cases, supra note 137, at 238 (indicating that the
Justices are "keen on limiting the reach of Apprendi"); Andrew M. Levine, The
Confounding Boundaries of "Apprendi-Land"': Statutory Minimums and the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 29 AM. J. CRIM. L. 377, 382 (2002) (stating that
Harris makes the extension of Apprendi far less likely in the immediate future).
The Court has certainly not retreated from its holding in Apprendi, however,
and, it could be argued, has extended the reach of the decision. See Blakely v.
Washington, 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004) (holding that the "statutory maximum" for
Apprendi purposes is the maximum sentence a judge may impose solely on the
basis of the facts reflected in the jury verdict or admitted by the defendant, not
the maximum sentence a judge may impose after finding additional facts); Ring
v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 589 (2002) (holding that "capital sentencing schemes"
in which a judge decides whether any "aggravating factors" are present, and
without which a death sentence may not be imposed, are inconsistent with
Apprendi).
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siderable leeway in deciding what statutory language requires
proof beyond a reasonable doubt.1 5 Despite recently addressing
issues such as whether certain facts must be treated as elements
of the crime and proven beyond a reasonable doubt, though, the
Court has not offered additional insight into the point at which
burden-shifting becomes unconstitutional. 15 9
2. The PROTECT Act's Affirmative Defense Unconstitutionally
Shifts the Burden of Proof to Defendants
Although the Court has consistently held that the burden of
proof of an element of a crime, as defined by the legislature, may
not be shifted to the defendant, it has not chosen to develop substantive constitutional criminal law that would create constitutionally required elements of crimes. 160 Issues regarding the
burden of proof for child pornography crimes are different than for
16
other crimes, however, due to First Amendment constraints. ' If
158 See Garfield, supra note 137, at 1379-80 (stating that "[t]he Court's
renewed commitment to evaluate for itself whether a legislature's definition of a
crime is appropriate [signals a] return to the pre-Pattersondays of Winship and
Mullaney").
159 See supra note 144 and accompanying text. The Court has not, for
example, followed the lead of those writers who have proposed tests for
determining the constitutionality of criminal statutes. See, e.g., Garfield, supra
note 137, at 1383 (proposing a "'two-prong' test for [courts to consider when]
evaluating whether the legislature may" permissibly shift the burden of proof in
a criminal prosecution); Kyron Huigens, Solving the Apprendi Puzzle, 90 GEO.
L.J. 387, 427-28 (2002) (arguing that "the prosecution must disprove
'justification defenses' because the prosecution always must prove wrongdoing in
order to justify punishment," but "on eligibility defenses ... such as insanity and
minority . . . the defendant [must] carr[y] the burden of persuasion"); Nancy J.
King & Susan R. Klien, Essential Elements, 54 VAND. L. REV. 1467, 1535 (2001)
(proposing a "multi-factor test" for determining the constitutionality of criminal
statutes).
160 See Claire Finkelstein, Positivism and the Notion of an Offense, 88 CAL. L.
REV. 335 (2000) (stating that the Court "has articulated few Constitutional
doctrines of [] substantial criminal law"); Louis D. Bilonis, Process, the
Constitution, and Substantive CriminalLaw, 96 MicH. L. REV. 1269, 1270 (1998)
(noting that no "substantive constitutional criminal law has sprung from the
courts' interpretations of [ ] presume[ed] . . . innocence and reasonable doubt").
While some scholars have argued that courts should create substantive
constitutional criminal law, such a process would likely be difficult. See
Standen, supra note 144, at 782 (arguing that "[flor courts to identify the
'essential' or 'core' elements of the gamut of crimes would require constant
attention and reconsideration and [would] thus seem [ ] incompatible with the
sporadic interventions characteristic of judicial oversight").
161 Of course, in addition to child pornography offenses, the First Amendment
also constrains the definitions of other offenses involving categories of speech
unprotected under the First Amendment. See, e.g., Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S.
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the First Amendment did not restrict the definition of child pornography, in defending the PROTECT Act the government could
argue that the involvement of an actual minor in a depiction is not
an element of the definition of child pornography under
§ 2256(8)(B), and the affirmative defense in § 2252A(c), exonerating the defendant if it is shown that the image does not depict an
actual minor, does not shift the burden of proof of an element of
the offense in § 2256(8)(B) to the defendant.' 6 2 The statute would
not be unconstitutional because the government would be
required to prove all of the elements of the offense beyond a rea16 3
sonable doubt.
The flaw in this argument is that even if § 2256(8)(B) does not
require that actual minors be depicted, the First Amendment
does.16 4 It is true that the Court has allowed certain facts, such as
self-defense, to be labeled affirmative defenses, and the burden of
persuasion placed on the defendant, even though such defenses
are probably constitutionally required.' 6 5 The Court has indicated, however, that it must be within the government's constitutional powers to criminalize the conduct described in the elements
of the offense without regard to any affirmative defense. 166 Some
343 (2003) (dealing with First Amendment issues involving a statute
criminalizing cross-burning with the intent to intimidate).
162 See supra notes 81-93 and accompanying text (describing the PROTECT
Act's virtual child pornography provisions).
163 See supra Part.IV.B.1. (describing the Court's burden of proof
jurisprudence).
164 See supra Part.IV.A. (illustrating that a constitutionally required element
of a child pornography offense is that the image in question depict an actual
child).
165 See Dripps, supra note 142, at 1676, 1677 (stating that the Court in Martin
v. Ohio, 480 U.S. 228 (1987), "rejected the possibility that the reasonable doubt
rule . . . appl[ies] to constitutionally required defenses without regard to
legislative classification," but noting that "if due process . . . requires . .. [the]
recognit[ion] [ofi any exculpatory doctrine at all, self-defense would. . . rank
among those required"); WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW § 1.8(c),
at 88 (2d ed. 2003) (noting that there are constitutional objections to the notion
that the State can punish a defendant for an act committed in self defense).
166 See supra note 144 and accompanying text (discussing the latitude
legislatures possess in defining crimes); see also Martin v. Ohio, 480 U.S. 228,
232 (1987) (emphasizing that the "New York [legislature in Patterson] had the
authority to define murder as the intentional killing of another person"). If such
a rule were not the law, it would be unconstitutional to presume a statutorily,
but not constitutionally, required element of an offense and shift the burden of
disproving the element to the defendant, see supra Part IV.B.1., but not to shift
the burden of disproving a constitutionally, but not statutorily, required element
to the defendant. Such a result would be flatly inconsistent with the Court's
burden of proof jurisprudence.
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courts have violated this requirement by allowing the burden of
proof of constitutionally required elements to be shifted to defendants through affirmative defenses.1 6 7 The Ninth Circuit, for
example,, has held, in a production of child pornography prosecution under 18 U.S.C. § 2251, that although "the [F]irst
[Almendment does not permit the imposition of criminal sanctions
on the basis of strict liability" in child pornography cases, knowledge of the age of the minor, which was "not an element of the
offense" under the statute, was required by the First Amendment
as an affirmative defense but "not as an element of the offense."' 6 s
The Ninth Circuit's decision confuses constitutionally required
affirmative defenses and constitutionally required offense elements and violates Mullaney by shifting the burden of proof
of a constitutionally required element of the offense to the

defendant. 169
The government cannot shift its burden of proof and require a
defendant to prove that images do not depict actual children in
order to avoid a criminal conviction. Nevertheless, the government may be able to defend the PROTECT Act on the basis that
See supra Part IV.B.1.
See United States v. United States D.C.D. Cal., 858 F.2d 534, 538-44, 543
n.6 (9th Cir. 1988). In rejecting the claim that the government was required "to
prove scienter as part of its case," the Ninth Circuit distinguished "Supreme
Court cases holding that the government must carry such a burden, in cases
involving booksellers and other downstream distributors," on the basis that
"producers are in a position to know or learn the ages of their employees." Id. at
543 n.6. Although the Ninth Circuit believed that the First Amendment did not
permit the imposition of criminal sanctions on the basis of strict liability, the
Supreme Court has indicated that scienter is not constitutionally required for
producers of child pornography. See United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 513
U.S. 64, 76 n.5 (1994); see also Outmezguine v. State, 641 A.2d 870, 877 (Md.
1994) (holding that a strict liability statute did not violate the First Amendment
in a production of child pornography case).
169 See, e.g., State v. Ryan, 543 N.W.2d 128, 142 (Neb. 1996) (stating that the
State may not constitutionally rely upon the affirmative defense of insanity as a
means of addressing the material element of malice in a trial for second degree
murder because it relieves the State from proving beyond a reasonable doubt the
defendant's guilt of each and every essential element of the crime, particularly
malice), overruled on the finding of necessity of malice by State v. Burlinson, 583
N.W.2d 31 (Neb. 1998). Even if the Ninth Circuit was correct that a fact such as
scienter can be constitutionally required as an affirmative defense but not an
offense element, the justification for such a holding would be that producers are
in a better position than the government to produce evidence on the issue of
scienter. Cf.X-Citement, 513 U.S. at 76 n.5 (stating that "producers are more
conveniently able to ascertain the age of performers" than are other child
pornography defendants). In contrast, defendants subject to the affirmative
defense in § 2252A(c) are not in a better position than the government to
establish the origins of images. See infra notes 198-203 and accompanying text.
167
168
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the affirmative defense in § 2252A(c) shifts only a burden of production, and not a burden of persuasion, to defendants. Section
502(c) of the PROTECT Act, which created § 2252A(c), provides
for an "affirmative defense" in certain circumstances, but the term
"affirmative defense" is ambiguous because it can place very different burdens on the defendant. 170 The term can refer to "the
burden of persuasion," which is "the burden of convinc[ing] the tribunal" that the elements of the defense have been met, but the
term can also refer to the less onerous "burden of production,"
which is the burden of presenting "sufficient evidence to ... support the presence of a defense."' 7 ' If the affirmative defense in
§ 2252A(c) is interpreted as shifting only a burden of production to
the defendant on the constitutionally required element that the
images depict actual children, the government would still retain
its burden of persuasion. 1 72 If the defendant satisfies his production burden by introducing evidence that the images in question
do not depict actual children, the government must persuade the
jury beyond a reasonable doubt that the images depict actual
children.' 7 3
170 See PROTECT Act, Pub. L. No. 108-21, § 502(c), 117 Stat. 650, 679 (2003)
(codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(c) (2003)).
171 See United States v. Prentiss, 256 F.3d 971, 975 n.2 (10th Cir. 2001); see
also Smart v. Leeke, 873 F.2d 1558, 1569 n.10 (4th Cir. 1989) (Murnaghan, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that "most, if not all, of the confusion in this area of the law
could be eliminated if the term 'burden of proof were stricken from our legal
vocabularies and replaced by two more precise terms, such as 'burden of
persuasion' and 'burden of producing evidence"'); Commonwealth v. Sojourner,
408 A.2d 1108, 1112 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1979) (stating that "'burden of proof is an
ambiguous term" and can mean either a burden of production or the burden of
persuasion); Huigens, supra note 159, at 427.
172 See infra notes 182-185 and accompanying text (describing the State
v.
Myrland decision).
173 In order to establish that an image is child pornography under § 2256(8)(B)
of PROTECT Act, the government must prove that: (1) the "visual depiction is a
digital image, computer image, or computer-generated image;" (2) the visual
depiction is of a person (whether real or virtual) under the age of eighteen; (3) the
visual depiction either is that of an actual minor or an ordinary person viewing
the depiction would conclude that the depiction is of an actual minor; and (4) the
minor depicted is engaged in sexually explicit conduct. PROTECT Act § 502. If
the affirmative defense in § 2252A(c) is interpreted as placing only a burden of
production on the defendant, one complication is the overlap between element (3)
and the affirmative defense in § 2252A(c). Element (3) can be interpreted as
giving the government the option of proving either that an actual minor is
depicted or that a virtual minor is depicted. If the government elects under
element (3) to establish that the depiction is of a virtual minor, § 2252A and
§ 2256(8)(B) could be interpreted together as requiring, if the defendant meets
his burden of production under § 2252A(c), that the government prove both that
the depiction is of an actual minor and that the depiction is "indistinguishable"
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The government can plausibly argue that the affirmative
defense in § 2252A(c) should be interpreted as placing only a burden of production on defendants. Some courts have held that statutes mut explicitly allocate to the defendant the burden of
persuasion for an affirmative defense, and in contrast to other
provisions of the PROTECT Act, section 502(c) does not explicitly
allocate such a burden. 1 7 4 The government can also argue that
the Court should invoke the canon of constitutional avoidance and
interpret § 2252(A)(c) as shifting only a burden of production in
order to avoid the serious constitutional issue of the government's
ability to shift the burden of persuasion to a defendant on an
essential element of a child pornography crime. 1 75 Section
2252A(c) can thus be interpreted as shifting only a burden of production to defendants while still assigning to the government the
burden of persuasion.
It is generally understood that the prosecution has both the burden of production and the burden of persuasion for all the facts
necessary to constitute the crime with which the defendant is
charged. 1 76 The Court, however, has never directly held that
shifting a burden of production to the defendant on an element of
a crime is unconstitutional. 17 7 To the contrary, the Court has suggested that shifting a burden of production to the defendant on an
element of an offense may be constitutional. 178 In Mullaney, the
Court noted that "[m]any States do require the defendant to show
from that of an actual minor. PROTECT Act §502. Obviously, proof that the
depiction is of an actual minor would also likely establish that an ordinary
person would conclude that the depiction is of an actual minor. In light of the
awkwardness of the second option under element (3), the government would
undoubtedly elect the first option of establishing that the image is that of a
minor, and, presumably, would not have to prove the element until the defendant
had satisfied his production burden.
174 See PROTECT Act § 502(c). See, e.g., United States v. Talbott, 78 F.3d
1183, 1186 (7th Cir. 1996) (holding that a statute must explicitly allocate to the
defendant the burden of persuasion as to an affirmative defense). Unlike the
affirmative defense in § 2252A(c), section 105 of the PROTECT Act provides for a
mistake of age defense in "sex tourism" cases but requires the defendant to prove
the defense by a "preponderance of the evidence." PROTECT Act § 105.
175 See United States v. X-Citement Video, 513 U.S. 64, 78 (1994) (stating that
"[iut is . . . incumbent upon us to read the statute to eliminate those [serious
constitutional] doubts so long as such a reading is not plainly contrary to the
intent of Congress").
176 See LAFAVE, supra note 165, § 1.8(a), at 77-78. If the prosecution does not
meet its production burden, the defendant is entitled to a directed verdict. See
id. at 77 n.8, 78-79.
177 See 1 PAUL H. ROBINSON, CRIMINAL LAw DEFENSES, § 4(b)(3), at 33 (2001).
178 See id.
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that there is 'some evidence' indicating that he acted in the heat of
passion before requiring the prosecution to negate this element by
proving the absence of passion beyond a reasonable doubt," and
indicated that "[n]othing in this opinion is intended to affect that
requirement."' 7 9 Further, in Patterson, Justice Powell, who dissented, stated that "even as to those factors upon which the prosecution must bear the burden of persuasion, . . . [tihe State
normally may shift to the defendant the burden of production,
that is, the burden of going forward with sufficient evidence 'to
justify (a reasonable) doubt upon the issue.""'
Some scholars and lower courts have interpreted the Court's
opinions as indicating that there is a constitutional distinction
between placing the burden of production on an accused and placing the burden of persuasion on an accused. They reason that
shifting a production burden does not involve the same concerns
that were addressed by the Court in Mullaney or Winship because
the defendant does not have to meet any persuasion burden at
all. ' In State v. Myrland, s2 for example, a Minnesota state
court held that the Minnesota child pornography statute, which
provided for an affirmative defense to a possession of child pornog179 421 U.S. 684, 701 n.28; see supra notes 133-36
and accompanying text
(describing Mullaney).
180 432 U.S. 197, 230-31 (1977). Justice Powell did indicate that "there are
outer limits on shifting the burden of production to a defendant" such as the
"rational connection" and "comparative convenience" requirements. See
id. at
230 n.16; see also infra notes 198-203 and accompanying text (applying the
comparative convenience test to the affirmative defense in § 2252A(c)); cf
Barton D. Day, Note, The Withdrawal Defense to Criminal Conspiracy: An
UnconstitutionalAllocation of the Burden of Proof, 51 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 420,
434 n.108 (1983) (explaining that Justice Powell may not have actually meant
that the burden of production can be shifted to the defendant on an element of
the offense).
181 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Sojourner, 408 A.2d 1108 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1979)
(finding in an unauthorized possession of a controlled substance case that the
burden of production of coming forward with some evidence of authorization to
possess a controlled substance could be placed on the defendant even though
unauthorized possession was an essential element of the crime); State v. Ryan,
543 N.W.2d 128, 150 (Neb. 1996) (Gerrard, J., dissenting) (arguing that "[t]here
is a clear constitutional distinction between casting the burden of production on
an accused and casting the burden of persuasion on an accused"), overruled by
State v. Burlinson, 583 N.W.2d 31 (Neb. 1998). In one of the more well-known
articles on the topic, John Calvin Jeffries, Jr. & Paul B. Stephan, III, Defenses,
Presumptions, and Burden of Proof in the Criminal Law, 88 YALE L.J. 1325
(1979), it was argued that placement of a burden of production on the defendant
is a "permissible housekeeping device" that does not raise any threat to the
reasonable doubt standard. See id. at 1334.
182 644 N.W.2d 847 (Minn. 2002), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1019 (2002).
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raphy charge if the person in the pornographic work was eighteen
years of age or older, did not unconstitutionally shift the burden of
proof because it imposed on defendants only a burden of production and not of persuasion."i 3 The Court, stating that it would
construe the statute to avoid an unconstitutional result, recognized that the burden of persuasion could not be shifted to the
defendant on an element of the offense but agreed with the prosecution that the burden of production could be shifted to the defen18 4
In the Court's view, the
dant without violating due process.
about an affirmative
Speech
Free
Supreme Court's concern in
defense "'seeking to impose on the defendant the burden of proving his speech is not unlawful"' was not applicable because the
it only imposed a burden of production on the
statute before
18 5
defendant.

Despite the Court's statements and lower court decisions, shifting a burden of production to the defendant on an element of a
crime is difficult to reconcile with the Due Process Clause of the
Fifth Amendment and the right to a jury trial guaranteed by the
Sixth Amendment.1 8 6 The distinction between a burden of pro183 See id. at 851. The affirmative defense provided: "It shall be an affirmative
defense to a charge of violating this section that the pornographic work was
produced using only persons who were 18 years or older." See id. at 850 (quoting
MINN. STAT. § 617.247, subd. 8 (2000)).
184 See id. at 851 n.2. The court accepted the state's argument that the
statute only required defendants "to make a prima facie showing that the age of
the person depicted was a disputed issue," at which point the burden would shift
back to the state to disprove the defense. See id. at 851.
185 See id. at 851 n.2 (quoting Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234,
255 (2002)). The court stated that "due process is violated [only] if (1) the
proffered defense disproves or negates an element of the charged crime, and (2)
the defendant has the burden of persuasion with respect to the defense." State v.
Myrland, 644 N.W.2d 847, 850 (Minn. 2002). The court's decision is consistent
with earlier decisions of the Minnesota Supreme Court. See, e.g., State v. Hage,
595 N.W.2d 200 (Minn. 1999) (holding that "if the mitigating circumstances or
issue disproves or negates an element of the crime charged, the greatest burden
the state may impose upon a defendant is that of shouldering the burden of
production").
186 Several authors have argued that placing a burden of production on the
defendant for an element of an offense is unconstitutional. See Day, supra note
180, at 434-35; Shari L. Jacobson, Mandatory and Permissive Presumptions in
Criminal Cases: The Morass Created by Allen, 42 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1009, 1032
(1988) (stating that "because courts cannot direct a verdict against the defendant
in a criminal case," shifting the burden of production is "probably
unconstitutional"); Leslie J. Harris, Constitutional Limits on Criminal
Presumptionsas an Expression of Changing Concepts of FundamentalFairness,
77 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 308, 340-41 (1986) (arguing that the Court's
decisions "preclude shifting the burden of production").
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duction and the burden of persuasion is a matter of degree rather
than kind, and the difference between the two burdens should not
be overstated. In order to determine whether a burden of production is satisfied, one must evaluate the persuasive force of the evidence that has been adduced on the relevant issue, and a litigant
has met his burden of production only if the evidence introduced is
sufficiently persuasive to create a reasonable doubt, or to meet
some lower standard."8 7 Apart from the similarity between a burden of production and the burden of persuasion, shifting a burden
of production violates the due process requirement that the government prove all elements of an offense beyond a reasonable
doubt.'
In addition, shifting a burden of production to the defendant violates the Sixth Amendment's right to a jury trial because
the failure of the defendant to meet the burden will result in a
directed verdict against the defendant.8 9
Placing a burden of production on the defendant on an element
of an offense violates due process because the defendant can be
convicted without any proof establishing the element. If the
defendant has a burden of production, the prosecution has no obligation to present evidence addressing the element until the defendant's burden is met.'9 0 The defendant can thus be convicted even
if neither side presents any evidence directly relevant to the element.19 ' Such a result would be hard to reconcile with the Court's
holding in Jackson v. Virginia,'9 2 that a conviction must be
reversed if there is insufficient evidence to allow a rational trier of
187 See Ronald J. Allen, StructuringJury Decisionmaking in Criminal
Cases:
A Unified ConstitutionalApproach to Evidentiary Devices, 94 HARv. L. REV. 321,
328-29 (1980) [hereinafter Allen, Structuring];Ronald J. Allen, Burdens of Proof,
Uncertainty, and Ambiguity in Modern Legal Discourse, 17 HARv. J.L. & PUB.
POL'y 627, 634 (1994) [hereinafter Allen, Burdens]. Professor McNaughton
famously made this point many years ago. See John T. McNaughton, Burden of
Production of Evidence: A Function of a Burden of Persuasion,68 HARv. L. REV.
1382 (1955) (arguing that a burden of production is also a burden of persuasion).
'sSee supra Part IV.A. (describing the Court's burden of proof
jurisprudence).
189 See Jacobson, supra note 186, at 1032 (stating that directed verdicts
against defendants at criminal trial are most likely unconstitutional).
190 See Day, supra note 180, at 435.
191 See Allen, Structuring, supra note 187, at 329 (stating that "[ilf the
defendant is unable to meet the burden of production, the state is thereby
relieved of the duty to present evidence and persuade the jury on an issue
relevant to the defendant's culpability"); Day, supra note 180, at 435-36;
ROBINSON, supra note 177, § 4(a)(2), at 24-25.
192 443 U.S. 307 (1979).
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fact to find each of the elements of the offense beyond a reasonable

doubt. 193
Placing a burden of production on the defendant also violates
the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial because it
requires the trial judge to direct a verdict against the defendant if
94
the burden is not satisfied.1 Placing a burden of production on
the defendant requires the judge, rather than the jury, to determine whether the burden has been met, and a ruling by the judge
that the defendant has not met his burden removes the element
from the case without the jury deciding whether it has been
proven. 19 5 It is true that, in a sense, verdicts on both affirmative
defenses and defenses that negate elements of the offense are
commonly directed against defendants. If the defendant does not
produce enough evidence, the jury will not be instructed on the
defense. 19 6 There is a fundamental difference, though, between
refusing to instruct the jury on a defense and removing an essen193 See id. at 319. But see Jeffries & Stephan, supra note 181, at 1334 (stating
that placing a burden of production on the defendant can be reconciled with the
beyond a reasonable doubt requirement "if one assumes that the prosecution
could prove beyond a reasonable doubt the absence of any exculpatory fact for
which the defendant could produce no affirmative evidence"). Professor
Robinson claims that the Court in Jackson "held that the constitution requires
the prosecution to bear the burden of production for all essential elements of the
offense." See ROBINSON, supra note 177, § 4(a)(2), at 22. While the Court's
opinion did not explicitly make such a holding, allowing a burden of production to
be shifted to the defendant on an element of the offense is inconsistent with
Jackson's requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt on every element of
the crime.
194 See United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 520 (1995) (noting that the trial
judge cannot order the jury to convict a defendant); Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570,
578 (1986) (stating that a directed verdict cannot be entered against a defendant
in a criminal case); LAFAVE, supra note 165, § 1.8(h), at 96-97 (stating that the
court cannot "direct the jury to find against the defendant on one of the several
elements of the crime, even though the prosecution's evidence concerning the
evidence is uncontradicted"); CHARLES A. WRIGHT & KENNETH W. GRAHAM, 21
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE EVIDENCE § 5142 (1977).
15 See Gaudin, 515 U.S. at 522-23 (stating that "[tihe Constitution gives a
criminal defendant the right to have a jury determine, beyond a reasonable
doubt, his guilt of every element of the crime with which he is charged"); see also
Harris, supra note 186, at 340-41, 341 n.153 (arguing that the Constitution
requires that the jury determine whether all of the elements have been proven
beyond a reasonable doubt, precluding the judge from taking an element from
the jury and directing its finding, and that "if a party suffers a directed verdict
for failure to satisfy a burden of production, allocation of the production burden
to that party also amounts to allocation of the burden of persuasion").
196 See Leach v. Kolb, 911 F.2d 1249, 1256 (7th Cir. 1990) (noting that
although a refusal to instruct the jury on an affirmative defense is the same as
directing a verdict against the defendant on the affirmative defense, courts have
upheld the practice); Harris, supra note 186, at 341 (explaining the practice of
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tial element of the crime from the case. The Court has seemed to
agree with this analysis, stating that
the effect of a failure to meet the producticn burden is significantly
different for the defendant and the prosecution. When the prosecution fails to meet it, a directed verdict in favor of the defense results.
Such a consequence is not possible upon a defendant's failure, however, as verdicts may not be directed against defendants in criminal
19 7
cases.

Even if shifting a burden of production to the defendant is not
presumptively unconstitutional, certain constitutional due process
tests would undoubtedly need to be satisfied before such a burden
could be imposed. Likely, at a minimum, a comparative convenience standard would need to be satisfied and would require that
evidence relating to the offense element be easier for the defendant to produce than the prosecution. 9 ' Regarding the affirmadirecting verdicts against defendants on both affirmative defenses and defenses
negating elements of the offense).
197 Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 516 n.5 (1979); see
also Engle v.
Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 120 n.20 (1982) (noting that the "[dlefinition of a crime's
elements may have consequences under state law other than allocation of the
burden of persuasion" because while defendants may be required "to come
forward with some evidence of affirmative defenses,.. . the State must prove the
elements [of a crime beyond] a reasonable doubt even when the defendant
introduces no evidence"). In addition to the reasons described above, the fact
that the virtual child pornography provisions raise First Amendment issues may
supply an additional reason why a burden of production may not be shifted to
defendants. The Court has indicated that it may have different standards for
reviewing burden of proof issues in First Amendment cases, and may disfavor
affirmative defenses in criminal cases that raise First Amendment issues
because affirmative defenses do not protect defendants from being prosecuted.
In Free Speech, the Court noted that the former affirmative defense in § 2252A(c)
"applies only after prosecution has begun, and the speaker must himself prove,
on pain of a felony conviction, that his conduct falls within the affirmative
defense." Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234, 255 (2002); see also
Ashcroft v. ACLU, 124 S. Ct. 2783, 2796 (2004) (Stevens, J., concurring) (citing
Free Speech in arguing that the Child Online Protection Act is constitutionally
suspect in part because its affirmative defense does not provide Web publishers
with assurances of freedom from prosecution); see infra note 227 (further
explaining the possibility that the standards may be different for cases that
involve First Amendment issues).
198 See Allen, Structuring,supra note 187, at 360 (stating that if a court today
were "to strike down a statute placing a burden of production on a defendant, it
probably would do so on the basis of the comparative convenience and rational
relationship tests"); supra note 180 and accompanying text (explaining that
Justice Powell indicated in Patterson that a comparative convenience test would
have to be met before a burden of production could be assigned to the defendant);
cf. ROBINSON, supra note 177, § 4(b)(2), at 31 (noting that some believe that a
defendant should be assigned a burden of production on an issue that is
peculiarly within his knowledge); MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.12(3) (1985) (defining
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tive defense in § 2552A(c), however, it is certainly not the case
that defendants have a comparative advantage over the government in producing evidence that images do not depict actual children. As the Court indicated in Free Speech, if the government
would have difficulty establishing that an image depicts an actual
child, the defendant would have just as hard of a time producing
evidence that no actual children were used, especially if the defen19 9
dant is merely a possessor and not the producer of the images.
It is difficult to imagine that defendants as a class are in a better position than the government to establish the origins of images
or whether they depict actual children. As Congress itself noted
in passing the PROTECT Act, "[a]n image seized from a collector
of child pornography is rarely a first-generation product ....
While the possibility exists that a defendant could retain an
expert to testify that a particular image does not depict an actual
2°
child, this hardly gives defendants a comparative advantage. '
To the contrary, the resources of the government, and particularly
its ability to gather images of child pornography without fear of
criminal prosecution, give it a significant advantage over defendants in establishing that an image depicts an actual child. The
government, for example, could potentially create a data base of
known victims of child pornography that it could use to establish
2
that a particular image depicts an actual child.20 In any case,
regardless of whether the government believes that its resources
are sufficient to enable it to effectively prosecute child pornography cases, it cannot plausibly argue that defendants as a class are

"affirmative defenses" as those that are "peculiarly within the knowledge of the
defendant").

U.S. at 255-56.

199 535
200 PROTECT

Act, Pub. L. No. 108-21, § 501(8), 117 Stat. 650, 677 (2003).
Congress itself expressed skepticism that experts would be able to
determine whether an image depicts an actual child. See id. § 501(8) (stating
that "the retransmission of images can alter the image so as to make it difficult
for even an expert conclusively to opine that a particular image depicts a real
child").
202 See, e.g., United States v. Hersh, 297 F.3d 1233, 1238 n.4 (11th Cir. 2002)
(describing how government agents compared a list of child pornography files on
a defendant's computer with a government database of known child
pornography); Comm. on Judiciary, The Child Obscenity and Pornography
PreventionAct of 2002, H.R. Res. 107-526, 107th Cong. §§ 8-9 (2002) (seeking to
create a database that would only be accessible to authorized law enforcement
personnel for all child pornography known to include images of actual children).
201
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better able to produce evidence of whether images depict actual
children.203
The PROTECT Act addresses many of the deficiencies in the
statute struck down by the Court in Free Speech, and the result is
a statute with a much narrower focus. 20 4 The remaining problem
with the PROTECT Act, however, is a fundamental one that will
likely doom it. As a result of the Court's decision in Free Speech,
the government must prove that an image depicts an actual child
in order for that image to be unprotected speech.20 5 It is likely
that the government cannot, consistent with the Constitution, satisfy its burden of proof by requiring the defendant to prove that
images do not depict actual children.20 6 Although less clear, it
also seems likely that the government cannot shift a burden of
production to the defendant of introducing evidence that images
do not depict actual children.20 7

V.

THE PRESUMPTION ALTERNATIVE TO THE

PROTECT

ACT

Part IV of this Article illustrated why the virtual child pornography provisions of the PROTECT Act are unconstitutional. If,
similar to the CPPA, the virtual child pornography provisions are
struck down, the government may attempt to yet again structure
203 Despite an old Supreme Court case that seems to approve of such a
practice, it is also unlikely that difficulties of proof would justify shifting the
burden of proof to defendants through an affirmative defense. In Morrison v.
California, the Court stated that the burden of going forward with evidence at
some stages of a criminal trial may be placed on the defendant, but only after
the State [has] proved enough to make it just for the defendant to be
required to repel what has been proved with excuse or explanation, or at
least that upon a balancing of convenience or of the opportunities for
knowledge the shifting of the burden will be found to be an aid to the accuser
without subjecting the accused to hardship or oppression.
291 U.S. 82, 88-89 (1934) (citation and quotations omitted). In Mullaney,
however, the Court rejected the argument that "difficulties in negating an
argument that the homicide was committed in the heat of passion" justified
shifting the burden of proof to the defendant. Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684,
701 (1975). The Court further stated that the burden of proof could not be
shifted to the defendant even though "intent is typically considered a fact
peculiarly within the knowledge of the defendant." Id. at 702. Later, in
Patterson, the Court explicitly recognized that a possible understanding of
Morrison has been overruled. See 432 U.S. 197, 203-04 n.9 (1977) (asserting that
"if the Morrison cases are understood as approving shifting to the defendant the
burden of disproving a fact necessary to constitute the crime, the result in the
first Morrison case could not coexist with In re Winship . . . and Mullaney").
204 See supra notes 81-95 and accompanying text.
205 See supra notes Part IV.A.
206 See supra notes 160-69.
207 See supra notes 170-203.
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the burden of proof in child pornography cases in order to ensure
their effective prosecution. After two unsuccessful attempts at
creating a constitutional statute proscribing virtual pornography
but allowing for an affirmative defense, the government should
consider alternative methods of manipulating the burden of proof.
Use of a presumption is one possible alternative. Several courts
have held that the government can meet its burden of proof in
child pornography cases by simply introducing the alleged child
pornography image at issue into evidence and allowing the
2
factfinder to conclude that the image depicts an actual child. "'
These cases raise the possibility that the government could enact
a statute that creates a presumption that an image is child pornography if the jury determines that the image looks like it is an
image of an actual child.2" 9
A presumption is a device which allows the jury to determine
the existence of an element of the crime when other, "evidentiary"
or "basic," facts are established. 2 10 There are two main categories
of presumptions. A permissive presumption, sometimes referred
to as an inference, "suggests to [the] jury a possible conclusion to
be drawn if the government proves predicate facts but does not
require the jury to draw that conclusion."2 1 1 Permissive inferences are constitutional if the connection between proved and presumed fact "is rational on its face or is rational based on the facts
of the given case. "212 The Court has stated that because "a perSee supra notes 122-25 and accompanying text.
Of course, it might be asked why the government needs to enact another
statute when it can meet its burden of proof, at least in most districts, simply by
introducing the images into evidence. While such an argument has persuasive
force, the government has a legitimate interest in guiding and structuring jury
decision-making to better ensure that juries do not acquit defendants on the
basis of unfounded claims that an image does not depict an actual child.
210 See Ulster County v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140, 156 (1979) (stating that "[iut is
often necessary for the trier of fact to determine the existence of an element of
the crime-that is, an 'ultimate' or 'elemental' fact-from the existence of one or
more 'evidentiary' or 'basic' facts"); see also Jacobson, supra note 186, at 1009.
211 See Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307, 313-14 (1985); Leo H. Whinery,
Presumptionsand Their Effect, 54 OiA.L. REV. 553, 561-62 (2001) (stating that,
for a permissive presumption, the usual case is that the court instructs the jury
that "it may regard the basic fact as sufficient evidence of the presumed fact but
it is not required to do so"); Jacobson, supra note 186, at 1012 (stating that "[tihe
purpose of [a] permissive presumption is to point out to the jury a natural
inference that it might otherwise be unlikely to note").
212 See Allen, 442 U.S. at 165; see also Kevin W. Robinson, Proof Issues, 90
GEO. L.J. 1740, 1748-49 (2002). The party challenging the presumption must
"demonstrate its invalidity as applied to him." See Allen, 442 U.S. at 157. The
Court in Allen left open the possibility that when the inference is the "sole and
208
209
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missive presumption [ ] allows - but does not require - the trier of
fact to infer the elemental fact from proof by the prosecutor of the
basic one," it does not "place [a] burden of any kind on the defendant" and is consistent with the Court's burden of proof
jurisprudence.2 1 3
Unlike a permissive presumption, a mandatory presumption
instructs the jury that it must infer the presumed, elemental fact
if the State proves the predicate facts. 2 14 "A mandatory presumption may be either conclusive or rebuttable .... A conclusive presumption removes the presumed element from the case once the
State has proved the predicate facts giving rise to the presumption."2 15 In contrast, "[a] rebuttable presumption does not remove
the presumed element from the case but nevertheless requires the
jury to find the presumed element unless the defendant persuades
2 16
the jury that such a finding is unwarranted."
In Ulster v. Allen,21 7 the Court suggested that mandatory presumptions may be upheld if the proved fact is sufficient to support
the inference of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.2 18 In later cases,
sufficient basis for a finding of guilt" it might have to satisfy a more stringent
test. Id. at 167; see also Miller v. Norvell, 775 F.2d 1572, 1575 (11th Cir. 1985)
(holding that where the basic fact of presumption was the only evidence of
presumed fact, the presumption was unconstitutional where the basic fact did
not prove the presumed fact beyond a reasonable doubt).
213 See Allen, 442 U.S. at 157 (stating that a permissive presumption leaves
the trier of fact free to reject the inference and does not shift the burden of proof).
214 See id.; see also Robinson, supra note 212, at 1749 (explaining that
"[u]nlike a permissive presumption, a mandatory presumption does not permit
the jury to reject the inference based on an independent evaluation of other
evidence in the record"). The purpose of the mandatory presumption is to weed
out justifications and excuses for the crime that the prosecution does not need to
overcome with evidence or address in presenting its case. See Jacobson, supra
note 186, at 1025.
215 Franklin, 471 U.S. at 314 n.2; see also Larry Alexander, The Supreme
Court,Dr. Jekyll, and the Due Processof Proof, 1996 Sup. CT. REV. 191, 197 n.21
(1996) (stating that "[w]ith the conclusive presumption, the crime is now
established by proving either the presumed fact or the fact that gives rise to the
presumption").
216 See Franklin, 471 U.S. at 314 n.2; see also Robinson, supra note 212, at
1749 n.1977 (stating that "[a] rebuttable presumption requires the jury to find
the presumed element unless the defendant introduces sufficient evidence to
persuade the jury that the inference is unwarranted").
217 442 U.S. 140 (1979).
218 Id. at 157-60, 166-67 (stating that "since the prosecution bears the burden
of establishing guilt, it may not rest its case entirely on a [mandatory]
presumption [that shifts the burden of persuasion] unless the fact proved is
sufficient to support the inference of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt"); id. at 169
n.2 (Powell, J., dissenting) (stating that the Court's opinion "suggest[ed] that
presumptions that shift the burden of persuasion to the defendant" are
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however, the Court has made clear that both conclusive
mandatory presumptions and mandatory presumptions which
shift the burden of persuasion to the defendant are unconstitutional. 219 The constitutionality of "mandatory presumption[s]
that shift only a burden of production to the defendant" is less
clear, and the Court has explicitly noted that it has not yet
decided the issue.2 2 ° In Allen, though, the Court stated that to the
extent that a presumption imposes an "extremely low burden of
production," such as "being satisfied by 'any' evidence, it may be
that its impact is no greater than that of a permissive inference,
and it may be proper to analyze [the presumption] as such" in
assessing its constitutionality. 2 2 '
Lower courts are split regarding the constitutionality 22of2
mandatory presumptions that shift only a burden of production.
constitutional if 'the fact proved is sufficient to support the inference of guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt"').
219 See Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 523, 524 (1979) (stating that a
presumption which shifted the burden of persuasion was found to be
unconstitutional in Mullaney, and a conclusive presumption is similarly
unconstitutional because it conflicts with the presumption of innocence and the
fact-finding function of the jury); see also Yates v. Evatt, 500 U.S. 391 (1991)
(holding that a mandatory presumption instructing the jury to presume malice
from use of a deadly weapon was unconstitutional), overruled on other grounds
by Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62 (1991); Carella v. California, 491 U.S. 263,
265-66 (1989) (holding that the statute and jury instruction, stating that theft
and embezzlement of an automobile could be presumed from the defendant's
failure to return the automobile within a certain period of time,
"unconstitutionally imposed a conclusive [mandatory] presumption as to the core
elements" of the crimes charged and "foreclosed independent jury consideration
of ... the facts").
220 See Franklin, 471 U.S. at 314 n.3; see also LAFAVE, supra note 165,
§ 3.4(c), at 218 (stating that the law regarding "mandatory rebuttable
presumptions is not entirely clear"); cf Mullaney, 421 U.S. 684, 702-703 n.31
(suggesting that a mandatory presumption shifts a "production burden to the
defendant [and] [ ] must satisfy certain due process requirements").
221 See 442 U.S. at 157-58 n.16.
222 Compare Davis v. Allsbrooks, 778 F.2d 168, 172 (4th Cir. 1985) (stating
that a mandatory presumption involving an element of the offense is permissible
where it is employed so as to merely "shift a burden of production to the
defendant" and where "the presumed fact is rationally connected to a proven
fact"); Graham v. State, 827 A.2d 874, 884 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2003) (suggesting
that such a presumption may be constitutional); Virgin Islands v. Parrilla, 7 F.3d
1097, 1103 (3d Cir. 1993) (suggesting that a mandatory presumption, even one
which shifts the burden of persuasion, is constitutional under certain
circumstances), with People v. Watts, 692 N.E.2d 315, 322-23 (Ill. 1998) (holding
that "mandatory [rebuttable] presumptions which shift the burden of production
to the defendant are unconstitutional" because they relieve the state of its
burden of proving the element in question beyond a reasonable doubt and can
result in a directed verdict); State v. Leverett, 799 P.2d 119, 124 (Mont. 1990)
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The arguments against the constitutionality of these presumptions are similar to those regarding the constitutionality of shifting a burden of production to the defendant on an offense
element.2 2 3 It is argued that mandatory presumptions that shift a
burden of production to the defendant violate the constitutionally
required burden of proof and the right to trial by jury because they
require the trial judge or jury to decide the case in accordance
with the presumption.2 2 4 It is not clear that burden of production
shifting mandatory presumptions are unconstitutional, however.
Unlike affirmative defenses which shift the burden of production
on an element of the offense to the defendant, a mandatory presumption requires the government to prove the offense element
beyond a reasonable doubt before the defendant is required to produce evidence, and the Court has disagreed with the notion that
an unconstitutional presumption is "equivalent to a directed verdict" against the defendant.2 2 5
Currently, there is a strong factual basis for the creation of a
presumption that images that appear to be child pornography are
in fact child pornography. As Congress found when enacting the
PROTECT Act, there is no evidence that any virtual child pornography is currently being created. 226 Based on the absence of evidence to the contrary, it would seem that there is at least a
rational connection between a finding that an image appears to
depict an actual child and the conclusion that the image does in
(stating that presumptions which are "presented to the jury in a manner which
places a burden of production on the defendant" are unconstitutional).
223 See supra notes 186-203 and accompanying text.
224 Many scholars have argued that these presumptions are unconstitutional.
See, e.g., WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 194, at § 5146 (1977) (stating that
production shifting mandatory presumptions are unconstitutional because a
directed verdict cannot be entered against a defendant); Day, supra note 180, at
439 n.140 (stating that a production shifting mandatory presumption may
unconstitutionally compel a defendant to present evidence because failure to
rebut the presumption will result in mandatory issue default); Jacobson, supra
note 186, at 1021; Note, Presumptive Intent Jury Instructions After Sandstrom,
1980 Wis. L. REV. 366, 374 (1980) (arguing that "presumption[s] [that] place a
production burden on the defendant raise significant constitutional questions");
Sundby, supra note 137, at 500-501 n.163 (discussing potential constitutional
problems with presumptions shifting a burden of production and stating that "a
failure to meet the burden of production could be characterized as a directed
verdict").
225 See Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 581 (1986) (stating that an
unconstitutional presumption is not equivalent to a directed verdict because the
jury still must find "every fact necessary to establish every element of the offence
beyond a reasonable doubt").
226 See supra notes 96-98 and accompanying text.
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fact depict an actual child. Indeed, currently the connection
appears to be true beyond a reasonable doubt. A permissive presumption informing the jury that it may make such a connection
would thus be constitutional, and a mandatory rebuttable presumption that shifts only a burden of production to the defendant
may also be constitutional.2 2 7
A presumption would help the government guide jury decisionmaking in child pornography cases to achieve its stated goal of
preventing acquittals based on flimsy defense claims that the
images at issue might not depict actual children.2 28 A presump227 These presumptions would not be constitutional if the Court does not allow
presumptions in cases that raise First Amendment issues. In Virginia v. Black,
538 U.S. 343 (2003), the plurality opinion, joined by four Justices, criticized a
"prima facie evidence" provision in a cross-burning prosecution which informed
the jury that it could find that the defendant burned the cross with "intent to
intimidate" from the fact of cross-burning itself. Id. at 363-64. The plurality
noted that "[tihe prima facie [ I provision [would] permit a jury to convict in every
cross-burning case in which defendants exercise their constitutional right not to
put on a defense," and that the "provision ma[de] it more likely that the jury will
find an intent to intimidate regardless of the particular facts of the case." See id.
at 365. Both Justice Scalia and Justice Thomas criticized the plurality's
treatment of the prima facie provision and argued that it was constitutional. See
id. at 369-79 (Scalia, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part,
and dissenting in part); id. at 395-400 (Thomas, J., dissenting). However,
Justice Souter, joined by two other Justices in an opinion concurring in the
judgment in part and dissenting in part, also criticized the prima facie provision.
See id. at 385-87 (Souter, J., concurring). Although it would seem that a
majority of the Justices believed the prima facie provision was unconstitutional,
it is difficult to state conclusively that a majority of Justices believe that all
presumptions are unconstitutional in criminal cases that raise First Amendment
issues. The plurality opinion criticized the prima facie provision because "a
burning cross is not always intended to intimidate" and stated that the provision
made "no effort to distinguish among [ ] different types of cross-burnings." Id. at
365-66. Thus, it could be the case that the plurality simply did not think that the
connection between the fact of cross-burning and cross-burning with intent to
intimidate was rational. If so, the plurality simply applied the traditional test
for permissive presumptions. In any case, even if a stricter test is required in
cases that raise First amendment issues, such as having to prove the connection
beyond a reasonable doubt, in child pornography cases the connection between
the fact that images look like they depict actual minors and the conclusion that
images actually depict minors may satisfy the test.
228 See supra note 101 and accompanying text. A mandatory rebuttable
presumption would easily fit into the current statutory scheme. The basic fact,
that an image looks like it depicts an actual child, would be the same finding that
the jury is required to make under § 2256(8)(B). See supra note 84 and
accompanying text (explaining that the jury is required to find that § 2256(8)(B)
is satisfied if "an ordinary person viewing the depiction" would conclude that the
image depicts an actual child). If the image looks like it depicts an actual child,
the defendant would be required to produce evidence that the image does not
depict an actual child, a burden identical to that imposed by the affirmative
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tion may not be a viable long-term solution to the government's
virtual child pornography problem, however. While a presumption may be effective in the short-term because no virtual child
pornography is currently being produced, if virtual child pornography becomes as prevalent as the government fears, or if more
courts decide that virtual child pornography can be easily produced, the factual basis for the presumption would be undermined.22 9 If, for example, virtual child pornography were to flood
the child pornography market, there would be no basis for concluding that an image depicts an actual child just because it
appears to depict an actual child.2 3 ° In such a situation, even a
permissible presumption might not be constitutional.
VI.

THE FUTURE OF CHILD PORNOGRAPHY PROSECUTIONS

The government is currently quite successful in prosecuting
child pornography cases. 2 3 1 In the future, if virtual child pornography floods the market as the government fears it may, and the
government is not able to develop new methods of proving that
images depict actual children, the government's ability to successfully prosecute many child pornography cases will undoubtedly be
compromised.2 3 2 The government will still be able to prosecute
defense in § 2252A(c) if it is interpreted as placing only a burden of production on
the defendant. See supra notes 170-75. If the defendant's production burden is
met, the government would have the burden of convincing the trier of fact that
the image in question depicts an actual child.
229 See supra note 126 and accompanying text.
230 In United States v. Kimler, 335 F.3d 1132 (10th Cir. 2003), the Tenth
Circuit held that because imaging technology has not advanced to the point
where indistinguishable images are possible, "U]uries are still capable of
distinguishing between real and virtual images ...

."

Id.

at 1142.

231 See supra notes 117-25 and accompanying text.
232 This could also occur if defendants become successful at disguising images
of actual child pornography to make it difficult or impossible to determine
whether actual minors are depicted. See supra notes 100-03 (discussing this
potential). As described in supra notes 97-98 and accompanying text, in contrast
to the CPPA where Congress aggressively proclaimed that virtual child
pornography was being produced, in enacting the PROTECT Act Congress found
that the cost of producing virtual child pornography will remain prohibitively
expensive for the foreseeable future. If Congress underestimated future
developments in technology, or the capabilities of current technology, virtual
child pornography could flood the market sooner than Congress expected.
Regardless of whether Congress's findings in enacting the PROTECT Act are
accurate, it seems probable that at some point, now or in the future, virtual child
pornography will be produced. Additionally, the government should not have to
worry about the constitutionality of proscribing visual depictions that have been
"created, adapted, or modified to appear that an identifiable minor is engaging in
sexually explicit conduct" because these images are covered by § 2256(8)(C),
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cases where it can specifically identify the child depicted or have
an expert testify that "an image predates [morphing] technology"
or otherwise give an opinion that an image likely depicts an actual
child.2 3 3 But these methods have limitations and would only be
applicable in some, but not all, cases.2 3 4 If the Court adheres to
its statements in Free Speech that virtual child pornography cannot be proscribed as a means of enabling the government to combat actual child pornography, the government could lose the
benefit of the child pornography exception to the First Amendment for at least some child pornography cases.2 3 5
Losing the child pornography exception would not necessarily
mean that the government could no longer prosecute cases involving sexually explicit images of children. Before the Court's decision in Ferber announcing the child pornography exception, the
government prosecuted sexually explicit images of children under
the Miller obscenity standard, believing at the time that almost
all of the child pornography on the market could be prosecuted
under the federal obscenity laws.2 3 6 Even now, over twenty years
after the Court announced in Ferber that the government is not
which was not challenged in Free Speech. Identifying such images and proving
that they depict actual children, however, may become more difficult in the
future. See supra note 54.
233 See Collins, supra note 78 (describing these methods of establishing that
images depict actual minors but arguing that each method has weaknesses). Of
course, the government may be able to develop new methods of proving that an
image depicts an actual child. See, e.g., supra note 202 and accompanying text
(suggesting that the government could construct a database of images of known
child pornography victims).
234 See generally Collins, supra note 78.
235 See supra notes 22-33 and accompanying text (describing the child
pornography exception to the First Amendment announced in Ferber). The
Court might respond, as it did in Free Speech, by speculating that "[i]f virtual
images were identical to illegal child pornography, the illegal images would be
driven from the market ... [because] [flew pornographers would risk prosecution
by abusing real children if fictional, computerized images would suffice."
Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234, 254 (2002). The argument that
virtual child pornography will drive all actual child pornography from the
market is suspect. See PROTECT Act, Pub. L. No. 108-21, § 501(12), 117 Stat.
650, 678 (2003) (stating that "the production of child pornography is a byproduct
of, and not the primary reason for, the sexual abuse of children" and "that there
is no evidence" that production of virtual child pornography would stop the
production of actual child pornography). Even if the Court's statement is true for
some pornographers, it is highly implausible that all, or even most, of those who
sexually abuse children, and memorialize the abuse through photographic
images, will suddenly stop doing so once virtual child pornography becomes
available.
236 See supra note 20. Although such statements are purely speculative, the
National Center for Missing and Exploited Children recently opined "that the
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constitutionally required to prove that child pornography is also
obscene, the government is no stranger to using obscenity statutes
to prosecute cases involving sexually explicit images of minors. In
aftermath of the Free Speech decision, the Attorney General
announced that the Department of Justice would use the federal
obscenity statutes as necessary to prosecute child pornography in
order to avoid the requirement of proving that images depict
actual minors.2 3 7
In the PROTECT Act, the government further explored the idea
of using obscenity statutes in cases involving sexually explicit
images of minors in order to avoid having to prove that the images
depict actual minors. Section 504 of the PROTECT Act created a
new statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1466A, which modifies the Miller standard for obscenity in cases involving sexually explicit images of
children.2 3 Section 1466A contains four separate obscenity provisions covering sexually explicit images of children. 23 9 While new
§ 1466A(a)(1) and (b)(1) merely proscribe images of minors that
are "obscene," and punish violators as though they had been convicted of a child pornography crime, § 1466A(a)(2) and (b)(2) both
contain an obscenity provision which eliminates the first two
prongs of the Miller standard.2 4 °
Obscenity is not defined by statute, but rather by the test provided by the Court in Miller, and the PROTECT Act is an attempt
to modify the Court's definition of obscenity as it relates to images
of children.2 4 ' Significantly, in cases under § 1466A(a)(2) and
(b)(2) there is no requirement that an average person, applying
contemporary community standards, would find that an image,
taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest or that the
vast majority.. . of all child pornography would be found to be obscene by most"
fact-finders. See S. REP. No. 108-002, 108th Cong. 23 (2003).
237 See Attorney General, Response to Supreme Court Decision in Ashcroft v.
Free Speech, DOJ Conference Center (April 16, 2002) (transcript at http://www.
usdoj.gov/criminal/ceos/ashcroft-freespch.htm); see also United States v. Dodds,
347 F.3d 893, 895-902 (11th Cir. 2003) (describing how the defendant was
successfully prosecuted under both child pornography and obscenity statutes).
238 See PROTECT Act § 504 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1466A); see
also supra notes 18-19 and accompanying text (describing the Miller standard
for obscenity).
239 See PROTECT Act § 504 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1466A).
240 See PROTECT Act § 504 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1466A).
241 Others have proposed the elimination of some of the Miller elements for
certain types of pornography. See, e.g., Bruce A. Taylor, Hard-Core
Pornography,A Proposalfor a Per Se Rule, 21 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 255, 276
(1987) (advocating "that courts [ I treat hard-core pornography as obscenity per
se [because] its commercial production necessarily involves prostitution").

694

ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH.

[Vol. 14

image depicts sexual conduct in a patently offensive way.2 4 2 The
only prong of the Miller standard required is that the image must
"lack serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value. 24 3
While it is possible that the Court will allow a modification of the
Miller standard as applied to sexually explicit images of children
because of the government's compelling interest in safeguarding
the well-being of minors, the new obscenity provisions in
§ 1466A(a)(2) and (b)(2) may well be struck down on the basis that
they eliminate constitutionally required elements of the obscenity
definition.2 4 4
Even if the new obscenity provisions in the PROTECT Act are
upheld, the significance of the possibility that the government
could lose the child pornography exception for at least some child
pornography cases should not be discounted. In creating the child
pornography exception, and rejecting the argument that the government should be limited to proscribing obscene images, the
Court in Ferber recognized that an obscenity standard is not "a
satisfactory solution to the child pornography problem," because
an obscenity standard "does not reflect the State's particular and
more compelling interest in prosecuting those who promote the
sexual exploitation of children. 2 4 5 Indeed, there are significant
See PROTECT Act § 504.
See id.
244 In defending § 1466A, the government can point to Ginsburg v. New York,
390 U.S. 629, 640-43 (1968), where the Court held that because of the state's
interest in the well-being of its children, it could proscribe the distribution of
"harmful to minors" material to children even though the material would not be
obscene for adults. However, eliminating the first two prongs of the Miller test is
extremely novel, and the Court could very well hold that all three prongs are
constitutionally required. In Free Speech, while the Court noted that the age of
the subject depicted could be relevant in determining whether a depiction is
obscene, the Court stated that the "CPPA cannot be read to prohibit obscenity,
because it lacks the required link between its prohibitions and the affront to
community standards prohibited by the definition of obscenity." Ashcroft v. Free
Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234 240, 249 (2002); see also United States v. Various
Articles of Obscene Merch., 709 F.2d 132, 135 (2d Cir. 1983) (stating that
"[slexually-oriented work is not obscene unless all three elements of the Miller
test are satisfied"). In addition, § 1466A(b)(1) and (b)(2) are constitutionally
suspect because they proscribe the possession of obscenity, which the Court
found to be unconstitutional in Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
Nevertheless, a comprehensive analysis of § 1466A is beyond the scope of this
Article, which focuses on the deficiencies of using any obscenity statute to
prosecute cases involving sexually explicit images of children.
245 458 U.S. 747, 761 n.12 (1982) (stating that it is simply "unrealistic to
equate a community's toleration for sexually oriented materials with the
permissible scope of legislation aimed at protecting children from sexual
exploitation"). Interestingly, Congress itself has stated that even a modified
242
243
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differences between the federal child pornography statutes and
the obscenity statutes, even a modified obscenity standard such as
that found in § 1466A, that make obscenity statutes less desirable
for the prosecution of cases involving sexually explicit images of
minors.2 4 6 Two differences in particular should be highlighted.
First, the Court has held that to avoid the risk of prior restraint
on speech, the government must use "rigorous procedural safeguards" before it may seize material which it considers to be
obscene, and material may not be taken out of circulation until
there has been a determination of obscenity after an adversarial
hearing.2 4 7 In contrast, because child pornography is afforded less
constitutional protection than obscenity and involves objective criteria by which to determine its unlawfulness, courts do not
require a prior adversarial hearing before the government may
seize all copies of the suspected child pornography. 2 4 Even
though two of the provisions in § 1466A have eliminated the first
two prongs of the Miller test, § 1466A will likely be treated as an
obscenity statute and not a child pornography statute. In a case
involving a state child pornography statute which contained an
exception for images possessing artistic merit, the Tenth Circuit
held that a pre-seizure adversarial hearing was constitutionally

obscenity standard "will not meet the government's compelling interest in
combating child pornography and preventing harm to children." S. REP. No. 108002, 108th Cong. 10 n.7 (2003) (discussing an obscenity provision similar to
§ 1466A).
246 Ferber itself illustrates that it is often easier to convict under a child
pornography statute than an obscenity statute. The Ferber case involved films
"devoted almost exclusively to depicting young boys masturbating," yet the jury
acquitted the defendant of the obscenity charges. 458 U.S. at 752.
247 See Fort Wayne Books, Inc. v. Indiana, 489 U.S. 46, 62-63 (1989); see also
Quantity of Copies of Books v. Kansas, 378 U.S. 205, 213 (1964) (holding that a
prior judicial determination of obscenity was required before any large-scale
seizure of materials for the purpose of destruction as contraband could occur).
248 See United States v. Kimbrough, 69 F.3d 723, 727-28 (5th Cir. 1995)
(stating that "[ildentification of visual depictions of minors engaging in sexually
explicit conduct," in contrast to a legal determination that materials are obscene,
"isa factual determination that leaves little latitude to the [police] officers");
United States v. Koelling, 992 F.2d 817, 822 (8th Cir. 1993) (noting that while
there is some chance of a "mistaken seizure," "[m]ost minors look like minors and
most adults look like adults, and most of the time most law enforcement officers
can tell the difference"); United States v. Smith, 795 F.2d 841, 847 (9th Cir.
1986); Boggs v. Merletti, 987 F. Supp. 1, 8 (D.D.C. 1997), affd on other grounds
sub nom, Boggs v. Rubin, 161 F.3d 37, 41 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (indicating that no
prior adversarial hearing is required before seizure).
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required because the statute had incorporated the third prong of
the Miller test.2 4 9
Second, pornographic material that is not child pornography,
including that under § 1466A, is not obscene if, viewed "as a
whole," it contains "serious literary, artistic, political or scientific
value."2 5 ° It would be erroneous to assume that material that
could be prosecuted as child pornography necessarily has no serious value. One of the reasons why the Court rejected an obscenity
standard in Ferber for child pornography was because a work can
contain "serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value [yet]
may nevertheless embody the hardest core of child pornography."2 5 1 The Court in Free Speech noted that its earlier decision
in "Ferber did not hold that child pornography is by definition
without value" and indicated that "some works in this category
"252 Unlike the first two prongs of
might have significant value.
value prong is an objective one, is
serious
the
the Miller standard,
not based on community standards, and requires the government
to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that a "reasonable person"
would find that the material lacks "serious literary, artistic, political or scientific value."2 53 Because it is an objective standard, "a
fact finder's determination that a work 'lacks serious literary
artistic, political, or scientific value' is 'particularly amenable to
'
appellate review. '254

At this point in time, it is difficult to estimate how many cases
involving sexually explicit images of minors will have to be proseSee Camfield v. Okl. City, 248 F.3d 1214, 1227 (10th Cir. 2001).
Compare Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973) (holding that material
is not obscene if it contains "serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific
value"), with United States v. Matthews, 209 F.3d 338, 345 (4th Cir. 2000)
(contrasting child pornography with obscenity and holding that there is no First
Amendment defense in child pornography cases for material with "serious
literary, artistic, political, or scientific value").
251 Ferber, 458 U.S. at 761. As the Court pointed out, "it is irrelevant to the
[abused] child [ I whether . . . the material . . . has literary, artistic, political or
social value." Id.
252 Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234, 248, 251 (2002) (stating
that the "artistic merit of a work does not depend on the presence of a single
explicit scene" (citing Book Named "John Cleland's Memoirs of a Woman of
Pleasure" v. Att'y Gen. of Mass., 383 U.S. 413, 419 (1966) (plurality opinion))).
253 See Pope v. Illinois, 481 U.S. 497, 500-01 (1987).
254 See United States v. Various Articles of Merch., Schedule No. 287, 230
F.3d 649, 653 (3d Cir. 2000) (quoting Smith v. United States, 431 U.S. 291, 305
(1977)). Indeed, it is probable that some courts will have a very broad definition
of "serious value." See, e.g., id. at 658 (holding that magazines depicting nude
children were not obscene as a matter of law because they "champion nudists'
alternative lifestyle").
249
250
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cuted under obscenity statutes if virtual child pornography
becomes widely available and the Court refuses to allow any
restrictions on virtual child pornography. What is clear, though,
is that the government is at risk of losing the benefit of the child
pornography exception to the First Amendment for at least some
cases involving sexually explicit images of minors. An obscenity
statute, even a modified one, is not a perfect substitute for a child
pornography statute, and the government will undoubtedly lose,
or choose not to pursue at all, cases prosecuted under obscenity
statutes that it could have won if they had been prosecuted under
child pornography statutes.2 5
VII.

CONCLUSION

Perversely, at a time when the child pornography problem is
growing rapidly because of advances in technology, prosecutions
under child pornography statutes face an uncertain future. In
passing the CPPA in 1996, Congress acted hastily, and the result
was a badly drafted and overbroad virtual child pornography statute that was enacted before such a prohibition was necessary.
Recently, in the PROTECT Act, Congress enacted a second statute
regulating virtual child pornography that contains similar
problems. If the Court adheres to the principles it espoused in
Free Speech, it is unlikely that any statute proscribing virtual
child pornography, regardless of how narrowly it is drafted, could
pass constitutional muster. While in the past the Court has been
deferential to the government when reviewing the constitutionality of child pornography statutes, in Free Speech it drew a bright
line between actual child pornography and virtual child pornography. If virtual child pornography ever becomes widely available,
and the government is unable to meet its burden of proving that
images depict actual children in a significant number of cases, the
government's options will be limited, and its efforts to destroy the
child pornography market may be diminished. In such a scenario,
the interesting question will be whether the Court is as committed
to free speech as it indicated in Free Speech.
255 States which do not have a modified obscenity statute such as § 1466A,
and thus will have to prove that an image satisfies all three of the Miller
elements, will face a bigger challenge than the federal government and may
consequently lose more cases.

